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c  G c > .!2 /3 I Abstract 
We  investigate the  role of budgeting procedures  for fiscal performance. 
Using 1970s  and  1980s  EC  fiscal data and expert characterizations of budgeting 
procedures,  we  find strong empirical support for  the  'structural hypothesis' 
that a  budgeting process with strategic dominance  of the  prime  or finance  (or 
treasury)  minister over  the· spending ministers,  limits on parliamentary 
amendment  power,  and limiting changes  during the. execution process  is strongly 
conducive  to fiscal discipline.  In contrast,  the role of long-term fiscal 
constraints  in achieving fiscal discipline,  while  generally positive,  is not 
statistically significant.  The  results suggest that institutional reform of 
the budgeting process  is a  promising avenue  to achieve  and maintain a  larger 
degree of fiscal discipline. Non-technical Abstract 
The  approach of a  monetary union in Europe has  raised concerns  about  the 
appropriate fiscal policy regime  in the  EC.  One  important worry  is that a 
systematic  lack of  fis~al stability of some  members  of the  European monetary 
union might create political pressures  for monetary expansions  which  the 
European central bank will find hard to escape,  resulting in persistent 
inflation.  As  a  result,  the  revisions of the Treaties of Rome  adopted  in 
Maastricht in December  1991  incorporate  a  procedure  to  supervise  the fiscal 
performance of the members  by  the  Community  and to  increase fiscal discipline. 
The  basic approach  taken in the Maastricht Accord is one  of controlling, 
ex-ante and ex-post,  the Member  States'  fiscal performance by  the  Community, 
spelling out budget criteria and procedures  for monitoring fiscal performance 
in the  EC.  To  be effective,  such  a  strategy must  rely on  the credibility of 
the penalties it entails for violating these criteria.  Experience with budget 
norms  in the U.S.  suggests  that governments ·find ways  to  circumvent fiscal 
restraints in practice,  with  the result that they are  largely ineffective.  In 
the  European context,  the  absence of a  strict enforcement mechanism of fiscal 
constraints among  sovereign nations  other than the  threat or possible 
application of peer pressure and financial sanctions raises  the  problem of how 
to ensure  the prospects of budget criteria to be  successful. 
This  study looks at the  issue  from  another perspective.  We  start from 
the presumption that budgeting procedures,  i.e.,  the rules  according  to which 
budgets are drafted by a  government,  amended  and passed by parliament,  and 
implemented by  the  government,  are  important for  the degree  of fiscal 
stability attained.  In other words,  we  claim that institutions shape  the 
outcome  of the political processes  evolvi~z within them.  One  variant of this 
claim  - that the greater credibility of an independent central bank's 
commitment  to price stability leads  to  lower inflation rates  - is,  of course, 
one of the  important justifications for  the  European monetary union itself. 
Our  main proposition is that a  budgeting procedure enabling a  government  to 
commit  itself to fiscal discipline is an essential condition for fiscal 
stability.  Commitment  mechanisms  are  important on all three levels of the 
budget process,  the bargaining within the cabinet of ministers,  the passing of 
the budget  law through parliament,  and  the execution of the budget. 
Budgeting in government  is a  process of allocating resources  to specific 
political programs  and distributing the cost over current and  future  tax 
payers.  There  are  (at least)  two  aspects  of this process which  generate 
problems  of fiscal discipline and give rise to  the  importance  of institutions. 
One  is the difference between the short-run and  the  long-run net benefits of 
fiscal programs,  which,  if policy makers  discount  the  future,  induces  a  bias 
towards  shifting tax burdens  to  future  tax payers via deficit financing.  The 
other is the difference between  the perceived marginal benefit and marginal 
cost of a  fiscal program.  Spending ministers  and  individual members  of 
parliament are  exposed  to political pressures  from  interest groups  and,  since 
taxes fall on the  general public while  expenditures benefit particular groups, 
are biased towards  large expenditures  and large deficits.  The  prime minister 
and the  finance  or treasury minister and broadly-based political parties in 
parliament,  in contrast,  do  not  depend on particular interest groups  to  the 
same  extent;  their decisions are more  strongly guided by general  economic 
consideratiorts.  The  distribution of power between these  two  groups,  therefore, 
determines  the size of the spending bias built into  the budgeting procedure. 
In view of this,  we  develop  two  propositions:  (1)  Institutions conducive 
to  long-run orientation of fiscal policies enhance  fiscal discipline.  The basic  idea is that long-run orientation mitigates  the conflict between short-
run and  long-run net benefits.  We  call this  the  long-term-constraint 
hypothesis.  (2)  Institutions which weaken  the  role of special interests in the 
budgeting process  are  conducive  to fiscal discipline.  Th~ basic  idea is that 
such institutions mitigate  the  spending bias arising from  the difference 
between beneficiaries and  the  general  tax payer.  We  call this  the structural 
hypothesis.  We  test both hypotheses using fiscal data  from  the  EC  member 
countries of the  1970s  and  1980s,  and characterizations of the national 
budgeting procedures  obtained from  expert assessments. 
The  main empirical result is a  strong support for  the structural 
hypothesis.  Specifically,  our results suggest  that a  budgeting process  lending 
the prime  or finance  (or treasury)  minister a  position of strategic dominance 
over  the  spending ministers,  limiting the  amendment  power of parliament,  and 
limiting changes  in the budget during the execution process  is strongly 
conducive  to fiscal discipline.  In contrast,  the  role of long-term fiscal 
constraints  in achieving fiscal discipline,  while  in most  cases positive,  is 
not  found  to be  significant.  While  we  do  not  conclude  from  this  that long-term 
constraints  lack importance,  our conclusion is that a  long-term constraint 
alone  is insufficient to  overcome  the problems  of fiscal discipline for  a 
country whose  budgeting procedure has  structural weaknesses. 
Our  results suggest  that institutional reform of the budgeting process 
is a  promising avenue  to  achieve  a  larger degree  of fiscal discipline.  Such 
reform may  be  required in some  countries  to  achieve  the fiscal  targets spelled 
out recently in the Maastricht Accord,  which  can be  regarded as  a  special  form 
of long-term constraints  on fiscal policies.  What  is more,  institutional 
reform meeting  the  requirements  and particularities of individual member 
countries  m~y be  a  promising route  to maintain  fis~al stability in the  third 
stage of European Monetary Union as  a  complement  to  the  imposition of fiscal 
criteria under  the current institutional arrangements. -1-
1.  Introduction 
The  approach of a  monetary union in Europe has  raised concerns  about  the 
appropriate fiscal policy regime  in the  European Community  (EC).  One  important 
aspect of this is  the  link between the  degree  of fiscal discipline  the member 
governments  of a  monetary union adopt  and  the union's  long-run inflation 
rate. 1  Many  participants in this discussion fear  that a  systematic  lack of 
fiscal stability of some  members  of the  European monetary union might create 
pressures  on  the  European central bank  to conduct  a  too  expansionary monetary 
policy for  the  Community,  with the result of lasting,  excessive inflation. 
Some  have  even argued that the  implicit possibility of taxing citizens of 
other countries which exists,  if the union's central bank can be  induced to 
bail out  governments  in financial crises,  would  lead to  a  deterioration of 
fiscal discipline in the  Community,  once  the  European monetary union is in 
place.  As  a  result,  the  revisions of the Treaties of Rome  adopted in 
Maastricht in December  1991  incorporate  a  procedure  to  supervise  the fiscal 
performance  of the members  by  the  Community  and  to  increase fiscal discipline. 
Although  the Maastricht Accord calls for  the  adoption of appropriate 
budgetary procedures by  the  member  states2 ,  the basic approach it takes  is 
one  of cotrolling,  ex-ante  and  ex-post,  their fiscal performance by  the 
Community.  The  hope  is that,  by spelling out budget criteria and procedures 
and penalties  for dealing with violations of these criteria,  member 
governments  can be  induced to  fiscal stability,  i.e.,  long-run budget balance 
or  debt  growth not exceeding nominal  GOP  growth.  To  be effective,  such  a 
strategy must  rely on  the credibility of the  threat it implies  for  members 
with deviant fiscal policies.  Experience with budget norms  in the U.S. 
suggests  that governments  find ways  to  circumvent fiscal restraints  in 
practice,  with  the result that they are largely ineffective  (von Hagen,  1991, 
1992).  In the  European context,  the  absence  of a  strict enforcement mechanism 
of fiscal constraints  among  sovereign nations  other than the  threat or -2-
possible application of peer pressure and financial  sanctions  raises  the 
problem of how  to ensure prospects of budget criteria to be  successful. 
This  study looks at the  issue  from  another perspective.  We  start from 
the  presumption that budgeting procedures,  i.e.,  the rules  according to which 
budgets  are drafted by  a  government,  amended and passed by parliament,  and 
implemented by the  government,  have  important consequences  for  the  degree  of 
fiscal stability attained.  In other words,  we  claim that institutions shape 
the  outcome  of the political processes  evolving within them.  This  requires 
that institutions are fixed relative to  the political processes  they govern, 
i.e.,  the  formation of rules  and procedures  for decision making  is not part of 
the  same  political process.  Instead,  the actors are legally bound or have  a 
common  understanding that the  institutions should be  regarded as  given.  Of 
course,  this does  not exclude  that the  institutions themselves  can be  changed 
over  time,  however,  doing  so would require  a  different political process.  One 
variant of this basic claim  - that the greater credibility of an  independent 
central bank's  commitment  to price stability leads  to  lower  inflation rates  -
is,  of course,  one  of the  important justifications for  the  European monetary 
union itself.  Following  the  same  logic,  our approach  leads  to  the  conclusion 
that institutional reform of the budgeting process  may  be  a  promising 
alternative for  the  EC  to foster fiscal stability. 
The  main proposition of this paper  is that a  budgeting procedure 
enabling a  government  to  commit  itself to  fiscal discipline  is an essential 
condition for fiscal stability.  Commitment  mechanisms  are  important on all 
three levels of the budget process,  the bargaining within the cabinet of 
ministers,  the passing of the budget law  through parliament,  and  the execution 
of the budget.  Commitment  is facilitated by restricting the effect bargaining 
processes  on each level can have  on total spending and revenues.  It can be 
provided by  formal  guidelines  determining the  outcome  of the budgetary process F
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or by restricting the  scope  of changes  participants in the bargaining process 
can make;  it can be  the result of legal restrictions on the process  or of 
long-standing traditions which  are  expected,  both by the participants in the 
budgetary process  and the public,  to be  respected in the future  (North and 
Yeingast,  1989).  We  develop  and test this proposition in two  versions:  One 
focusing  on the  existence  and  implementation of long-term fiscal plans and the 
other focusing  on the structural characteristics of the budgeting process.  Our 
empirical results using data from  the  EC  suggest that structural 
characteristics are  important.  Specifically,  dominance  of the prime minister 
or finance minister over  the  spending ministers  in setting budget parameters, 
limitations to modifications of the budget proposal by  the  legislature,  and 
limitations to budget changes  during the  execution are institutions conducive 
to fiscal stability. 
This  study proceeds as follows. _Section 2  presents some_sty.lized 
evidence of fiscal performance  in the  Community  over  the past two  decades. 
Section 3  outlines our basic theoretical argument.  Section 4  begins with a 
review of the main characteristics of the budgeting procedures currently used 
in the  12  countries of the  Community  based on a  questionnaire sent to  the 
member  Finance Ministries or Treasuries  in 1991.  Section 5  presents  the 
empirical tests of our main hypotheses  of interest.  Section 6  summarizes  our 
main conclusions. 
2.  Fiscal Performance  in the  EC,  1971-90:  Some  Stylized Facts 
Figures  1  through  8  give  an  impression of the fiscal performance of the 
12  EC  member  states over  the past decades.  Figures  1  and  2  depict the  growth 
of general  government  expenditures relative to  gross domestic product  (GDP). 
Throughout  the  1960s,  there was  remarkable similarity among  the six EC  members 
and  Ireland,  Denmark  and  the  U.K ..  Ratios  of expenditures  to  GDP  varied 0
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between  25  and  35  percent at the beginning of this decade;  by its end,  they 
had risen to  between  30  and 40  percent.  In fact,  these ratios generally 
declined in the late the  1960s.  The  1970s brought  two  important changes:  a 
faster rise of expenditures relative to  GOP  in most  countries  - the  exceptions 
being France,  and,  after initial surges,  Britain and Germany  - and an  increase 
in the variance of these ratios across  the  EC  members.  Expenditure ratios 
generally peaked in the early 1980s,  followed by moderate  declines  in Germany, 
France,  and the U.K.,  and more  significant reductions  in Denmark,  Belgium, 
Luxembourg,  Ireland,  and the Netherlands.  In contrast,  Greece,  Spain,  and 
Italy maintained positively trending expenditure ratios  throughout  the  decade. 
Figures  3  and 4  show  the development of net government  lending,  i.e., 
total revenues  less expenditures,  throughout  the  same  period. 3  Once  again, 
during the  1960s we  find a  striking similarity among  the  European countries. 
The  ratios of net lendiqg to  GDP  differed by a  maximum  of about_ s.ev:en  perc.ent. 
Once  again,  the  1970s brought much  larger variation among  these countries. 
After 1975,  Italy,  Belgium and Ireland had the most  rapidly deteriorating 
budgets.  Belgium and Ireland showed  some  improvement  in the mid- and late 
1980s,  but still retained some  of the largest relative deficits in the  group. 
Denmark  and Luxembourg  are most noteworthy for  the wide  swings  in their net 
lending ratios during this period.  In contrast,  France,  Germany  and  the U.K. 
enjoied steady developments  and moderate deficits.  With  the  exception of 
Italy,  Greece  and Belgium,  the  EC  countries  achieved a  greater degree  of 
convergence  of net lending ratios again  towards  the  end of the  1980s. 
Figures  5  and  6  look at the relative budget balances  in, terms  of net 
government  lending excluding interest payments,  called primary net lending for 
short.4  Primary net lending shows  to what extent governments  accumulate  new 
debt during a  period over  and  above  what  is required to service existing 
interest obligations  and  thus  gives  a  better indication than total net lending F
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of a  government's  need and willingness  to change budget  developments.  Here,  we 
observe  a  greater degree  of conformity among  the  12  countries  throughout  the 
whole  period.  Only Italy and Ireland started the  1970s with primary deficits 
(net  borrowing),  only Italy and Greece  ended  the  1980s  in this way.  Denmark 
and Luxembourg  are most noteworthy for  the  large swings  in their primary net 
lending.  Ireland's primary deficit deteriorated very rapidly in the mid-1970s, 
it improved steadily from  six percent to a  surplus of six percent of GDP 
between 1981  and 1989.  While  France  and the U.K.  had primary surpluses during 
most  of this period,  Germany  experienced deficits  from  1974  through 1982. 
Figures  7  and  8  demonstrate  the ratios of gross  public debt  to  GDP  from 
1971  to  1990.  At  the beginning of the  1970s,  the  EC  was  divided in two  groups, 
a  relatively high-debt  group  including Italy,  Belgium,  the Netherlands, 
Ireland,  and  the U.K.,  with ratios of debt to  GDP  between  50  and  85  percent, 
and.a .relatively low-debt. group  comprising Denmark,  West  Germany, .France, 
Luxembourg,  Spain,  Greece,  and Portugal,  with ratios between 10  and  30 
percent.  By  the  end of the  1980s,  three  groups  are discernable:  Luxembourg, 
France,  Spain,  the U.K.  and Germany,  all with debt  to  GDP  ratios of no  more 
than 40  percent;  Denmark,  the Netherlands,  Portugal  and Greece,  whose  ratios 
are between  60  and  80  percent;  and Belgium,  Ireland,  and Italy,  whose  ratios 
are  above  80  percent. 
Apart  from  these  differences  in the debt ratios  themselves,  the  dynamics 
vary significantly among  the  12  countries.  The  U.K.  and  Luxembourg 
consistently experienced falling debt ratios  throughout  the period,  and the 
French ratio was  virtually flat.  All other countries  experienced significant 
growth  in their debt ratios  following  the  second oil price shock  in 1979; 
onlyireland and  Denmark  had significantly rising debt ratios already earlier 
in the  1970s.  Only  these  two  countries managed  to  reduce  their debt ratios 
significantly during  the  1980s,  while  other countries merely succeeded in 1
4
0
 
1
2
0
 
a
.
.
 
0
 
1
0
0
 
(
.
!
)
 
'
+
-
0
 
8
0
 
Q
)
 
0
)
 
r
o
 
6
0
 
+
-
'
 
c
 
Q
)
 
(
.
)
 
4
0
 
'
-
Q
)
 
c
.
 
2
0
 
0
 
7
1
 
F
i
g
.
 
7
:
 
G
r
o
s
s
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
D
e
b
t
 
(
p
e
r
c
.
 
o
f
 
G
O
P
,
 
1
9
7
1
-
9
0
)
 
7
3
 
7
5
 
7
7
 
7
9
 
8
1
 
8
3
 
8
5
 
8
7
 
Y
e
a
r
 
•
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
 
-
+
-
-
-
F
r
a
n
c
e
 
>
I
<
 
I
t
a
l
y
 
o
 
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
 
>
<
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
 
•
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
 
I
 
-
N
 
8
9
 c
_
 
0
 
(
.
9
 
'
+
-
0
 
Q
)
 
(
J
)
 
c
u
 
.
.
-
c
 
Q
)
 
(
.
)
 
'
-
Q
)
 
c
.
 
1
2
0
 
1
0
0
 
8
0
 
6
0
 
4
0
 
2
0
 
/
 
0
 
7
1
 
F
i
g
.
 
8
:
 
G
r
o
s
s
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
D
e
b
t
 
(
p
e
r
c
.
 
o
f
 
G
O
P
,
 
1
9
7
1
-
9
0
)
 
7
3
 
7
5
 
7
7
 
7
9
 
8
1
 
8
3
 
8
5
 
8
7
 
Y
e
a
r
 
)
I
<
 
S
p
a
i
n
 
8
9
 
•
 
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
 
o
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
 
_
.
.
.
_
_
_
 
G
r
e
e
c
e
 
>
<
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
 
*
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
 
I
 
-
w
 
I
 - 14-
Table  1:  Average  Net  Government  Lending.  1971  - 1990 
Country  1971-75  1976-80  1981-85  1986-90 
Net  Lending of Government  (%  of GOP) 
Belgium  -3.54  -6.76  -10.52  -7.10 
Denmark  2.94  -1.20  -5.86  0.86 
Germany  -1.16  -2.66  -2.42  -1.44 
Greece  - - -10.16  -15.70 
Spain  0.22  -0.32  -5.30  -3.78 
France  0.16  -0.64  -2.70  -1.86 
Ireland  -6.72  -10.00  -12.00  -6.48 
Italy  -7.06  -8.10  -11.48  -10.88 
Luxembourg  2.68  2.22  1.24  2.80 
Netherlands  -0.74  -2.98  -6.02  -5.70 
Portugal  - - -10.16  -5.72 
u.  K.  -2.20  -3.80  -3.02  -0.42 
EC  Average  ~1.54  -3.42  -6.53  -4.62 
St.D.  3.43  3.82  4.29  5.18 
Median  -1.16  -2.91  -6.02  -5.70 
Net Government  Lending  Excluding Interest 
{%  of GOP) 
Belgium  -0.10  -2.00  -1.02  3.70 
Denmark  4.26  1.38  1.90  8.78 
Germany  -0.02  -0.94  0.38  1.38 
Greece  - - -6.32  -7.62 
Spain  0.74  -0.76  -3.56  -0.22 
France  1.18  0.48  -0.26  1.00 
Ireland  -2.28  -4.16  -2.92  2.80 
Italy  -4.50  -3.28  -4.16  -2.20 
Luxembourg  3.66  3.08  2.28  3.70 
Netherlands  2.12  0.22  -0.56  0.36 
Portugal  - - -3.76  2.32 
U.K.  1.58  0.54  1.88  3.50 
EC  Average  0.66  -0.54  -1.51  1.46 
S.t.D.  2.61  2.17  2.73  3.94 
Median  0.74  -0.76  -1.02  2.32 - 15-
Table  2:  Average  Gross  Public Debt.  1971  - 1990 
Country  1971-75  1976-80  1981-85  1986-90 
Gross  Public Debt  (%  of GDP) 
Belgium  63.5  68.04  105.08  128.44 
Denmark  9.12  23.72  68.68  63.58 
Germany  20.10  29.82  40.16  43.82 
Greece  22.52  26.34  46.58  77.06 
Spain  13.48  15.06  35.58  46.06 
France  23.78  23.52  29.26  35.35 
Ireland  59.92  71.96  94.68  110.34 
Italy  56.88  59.88  72.14  95.30 
Luxembourg  21.68  15.28  14.54  10.16 
Netherlands  44.54  41.88  60.74  76.26 
Portugal  20.13  35.80  56.70  70.50 
U.K.  68.56  57.80  58.12  50.40 
EC  Average  35.35  39.09  56.86  67.27 
St.  D.  21.66  20.43  26.17  33.23 
Median  22.52  29.82  56.70  63.58 - 16-
preventing further  increases.  The  three countries  in the high-debt group  of 
1990 were  in the high-debt  group  of 1971;  four  of five  countries  in the  low-
debt group of 1990 were  in the  low-debt  group  of 1971.  Only  the U.K.  moved 
from being the high-debt  group  in 1971  to  the  low-debt  group  in 1990.  In sum, 
relative debt performances  are very persistent in Europe. 5 
Tables  1,  2,  and  3  illustrate the  same  developments  by reporting five-
year moving averages of net government  lending,  primary net government 
lending,  gross public debt,  and general  government  expenditure,  all expressed 
as  fractions  of GDP.  The  rising standard deviations of the first three 
variables over  this period reflect the  increasing disparity in fiscal 
performance  among  the  12  European countries.  Only  the  standard deviation of 
expenditures ratios declines  towards  the  end of the  1980s. 
While  the preceding graphs  and tables demonstrate considerable variation 
of fiscal outcomes  in the  EC,  they  do  not tell us  anything about  the  source of 
these differences.  Two  extreme  scenarios are possible:  Fiscal outcomes  in 
individual countries could be  completely determined by country-specific, 
mutually uncorrelated shocks.  Alternatively,  fiscal  outcomes  could reflect 
country-specific responses  to  the  same  shock(s).  Consider  the  following  two-
country model  as  an illustration: 
Y  i,  t  =  f3 i xt + u i,  t 
y j , t  = fJ j~ +  u j . t 
cov(u1,t,uj,t)  =  0, 
(1) 
where  Yi,t denotes  country i's fiscal  ~utcome variable,  xt  is  the underlying 
shock common  to both countries,  the coefficient  {3  describes  a  country's 
reaction to the  common  shock,  and u  is its reaction to purely country-specific 
shocks.  The  first scenario of purely country-specific  shocks  implies  Xt  - 0, 
which  in turn implies  that Yi,t  and Yj,t  are uncorrelated.  The  second scenario -17-
Table  3:  Average  Government  Expenditure 
Country  1971-75  1976-80  1981-85  1986-90 
Government  Expenditure  (%  of GOP) 
Belgium  42.98  51.32  57.96  53.46 
Denmark  44.36  51.32  60.44  57.66 
Germany  43.16  47.90  48.44  46.32 
Greece  - - 42.70  49.94 
Spain  23.60  29.18  38.70  41.32 
France  39.12  44.54  50.86  50.48 
Ireland  40.18  45.88  53.30  47.84 
Italy  35.84  39.50  48.38  51.42 
Luxembourg  38.84  51.92  54.58  51.20 
Netherlands  44.96  54.38  60.58  58.88 
Portugal  - - 44.34  43.50 
U.K.  39.90  42.30  44.66  39.78 
EC  Average  39.29  45.80  50.41  49.32 
St.  D.  6.20  7.50  7.14  5.94 
Median  39.12  45.88  48.88  49.94 -18-
Table  4:  Factor Analysis of Government  Expenditure.  Net  Lending.  and  Debt 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Government 
Expenditure 
Variance 
explained 
96.5 
94.1 
90.0 
76.0 
96.4 
97.0 
90.0 
93.5 
85.0 
Netherlands  93.2 
Portugal 
United 
Kingdom 
16.5 
91.8 
Factor 
pattern 
+  n 
+ 
+ 
n  n 
+ 
+  + 
+ 
+  n 
+ 
n  n 
+ 
Net  Lending less 
Interest Paid 
Variance 
explained 
99.2 
84.3 
92.7 
94.5 
98.7 
95.6 
95.0 
90.9 
98.8 
96.3 
96.4 
98.2 
Factor 
pattern 
+  + 
+  n 
n 
+  n 
+  + 
+  + 
+  n 
+ 
+  + 
+  n 
+ 
Gross  Public Debt 
Variance 
explained 
98.1 
96.4 
95.5 
83.3 
96.3 
96.6 
95.9 
97.0 
92.9 
96.7 
20.7 
-94.9 
Factor 
pattern 
+  n 
+  n 
+ 
n 
+ 
+  + 
+  n 
+ 
n  n 
+ 
Note:  Variance explained is the percentage of variance explained by  two  common 
factors.  Factor patterns:  '+'  or '-' indicates that the  estimated coefficient 
for this factor is above  or below the  average  estimate  for all 12  countries. 
'n'  indicates factor is not significant at the  10  percent level.  Period for 
estimation:  1971  - 1990;  1981  - 90  for Greek and Portuguese  expenditure 
ratios. 
holds when  u1,t  =  uj,t =  0,  and  {J1  differs  from  fJj.  Note  that we  can extend 
equation  (1)  in a  simple way  to contain two  common  shocks: 
Yi,t  =  fJ1,ixl,t  + fJ2,ix2,t  +  ui,t 
Yj,  t  = fJ1,jxl, t  +  fJ2,jx2, t  + uj,  t 
cov(u1,t,uj,t) = 0, 
(2) -19-
in which case  the  two  outcomes  are less than perfectly correlated,  even if 
there are  no  country-specific shocks,  provided that the pairs of reaction 
coefficients are different between the countries. 
To  see which of these  two  paradigms  describes  the  European case 
best,  we  apply  factor analysis  to  our ratios of general  government  spending, 
net government  lending,  and gross public debt  to GDP.  This  technique  allows  to 
estimate  the unobserved  common  shocks  explaining a  set of time series,  their 
'common  factors',  corresponding to  the variables x1,t and x2,t in model  (2).  By 
construction,  these  shocks  are uncorrelated with each other and with the 
country-specific shocks.  Having obtained estimates of these  factors,  we  can 
then use  regression analysis  to  see how  much  of the variance of the  observed 
fiscal  outcomes  is explained by reactions  to  common  shocks  as  opposed  to 
country specific shocks.  The  results of this procedure  are  summarized  in Table 
4.  For  each variable,  two  common  £actors were  estimated.  The £irst _o£  .each 
pair of columns  indicates  the percentage of the  total variance of the variable 
explained by  a  country's reaction to  the  two  common  shocks.  For all three 
variables,  we  find that almost all the variance  is explained by  the  two  common 
factors.  Greece  and Portugal are  the  only  two  exceptions  to this result. 6  The 
second column in each pair gives  some  information about  the  country's reaction 
to  the  common  factor  as  determined by  the  regression analysis.  Here,  a  '+' 
means  that the  regression coefficient on this factor  is significant and  above 
the  average  of the  significant estimates  for all 12  countries,  a  '-'  indicates 
a  significant coefficient below  the  average  estimate,  and  a  'n'  indicates  that 
the  factor  was  not significant in the regression.  The  main conclusion from 
this exercise is that fiscal policies  in the  EC  countries,  as  described by 
deficits,  spending  and debt patterns,  can best be  characterized by  country-
specific reactions  to  common  shocks,  rather than responses  to country-specific 
shocks.  To  the  extent that fiscal  institutions determine  a  country's fiscal--20-
policy response  to  economic  shocks,  institutional differences across  these 
countries may  be  important  to explain this variation in fiscal  outcomes. 
In Table  5,  we  address  the relationship between government  expenditures 
and net lending.  According  to  a  popular hypothesis,  large  and  growing deficits 
- and,  therefore,  growing debt  to  GDP  ratios - are  caused by  large  and  growing 
levels of government  expenditure  (see e.g.  Roubini  and Sachs,  1989a,  Larkey et 
al.,  1981).  If this was  true,  greater fiscal discipline could be  achieved by 
reducing  government  spending.  To  test this hypothesis,  we  check for Granger-
Table  5:  Causality of Government  Expenditure  for Net Lending 
Country  R2  of Test  F-Test  for  F-Test  for Serial 
Regression  Causality  Correlation of 
Residuals 
Belgium  0.89  0.16  0.95 
Denmark  0~ 7h  04H.l  0  .. 56 
Germany  0.44  0.19  0.93 
Greece  0.83  0.53  0.30 
Spain  0.54  0.30  0.41 
France  0.53  0.91  0.64 
Ireland  0.83  0.08  0.79 
Italy  0.87  0.04  0.42 
Luxembourg  0.45  0.83  0.80 
Netherlands  0.87  0.08  0.93 
Portugal  0.95  0.09  n.a. 
United Kingdom  0.61  0.33  0.84 
Note:Tests  are  for Granger-causality of changes  in the  expenditure/GOP ratio 
for net government  lending I  GDP.  Test regression includes  two  lags  of the 
dependent  and  two  lags  of the  independent variable.  Sample  period is  1961  -
1990  except  for  Spain  (1971- 1990),  Greece  (1980-1990)  and  Portugal  (1980 
1990).  Tests  for serial correlation of residuals check the  significance of 
four  a  test regression of the  residuals  from  the causality test regression on 
four  of own  lags.  All entries are probabilities of F  values  larger than 
estimated F's under  the Null-hypotheses of non-causality and no  serial 
correlation. 
causality of government  spending for net lending,  both measured relative  to (4) 
-21-
GDP. 7  Defining rlt  as  the ratio of net lending to  GOP  and gt as  the ratio of 
expenditure  to  GOP,  we  estimate  the  following  regression model: 
(3) 
where  et is a  serially uncorrelated regression error.  The  test for  Granger-
causality in this context is an F-test on the joint significance of 1 1  and  12 ~ 
The  first column in Table  5  shows  that the test regressions  explain most 
of the variance of the  dependent variable.  The  second one  indicates  that 
expenditure ratios  do  not generally Granger-cause net  lending ratios,  if 
standard significance levels are applied.  Italy is the  only exception. 8  The 
last column  shows  that the  regression errors are  indeed serially uncorrelated, 
an  important condition for  the reliability of the F-test.  Overall,  Table  5 
produces  two  interesting findings:  First,  the  regression R2's show  that the 
low-debt countries of 1990,  Luxembourg,  Spain,  France,  Germany,  and  the U.K., 
have  the  s~allest degree  of persistence in net  lending ratios  in the  sense 
that their past net lending ratios are  the  least helpful  to predict current 
ratios.  Tnis  su~2ests that countries which manage  to  change  their budgets  less 
easily over  time  are  more  prone  to  large deficits  and debt.  Second,  with the 
exception of Italy,  the  simple hypothesis  that rising deficits are  the result 
of growing expenditures  is not warranted by  the  data. 
While  tables  4  and  5  compare  time  series properties of the  data across 
countries,  table  6  takes  a  different perspective and  compares  average  relative 
performances  among  the  12  European countries  during  the  1980s.  The  table is 
based on  the  moving  averages  calculated in table 1.  After ordering the  12 
countries  according  to  the  size of each variable,  we  compute  the  Spearman  rank 
correlation coefficients  shown  in table  6.  The  first four  coefficients - all 
significantly positive - confirm and  extend the  earlier finding  that relative -22-
Table  6:  Rank  Correlation Coefficients 
Items 
Net  Lending  1981-85 vs. 
Net Lending  1986-90 
Net  Lending  Excl. 
Interest,  1981-85 vs. 
1986-90 
Gross  Public Debt, 
1981-85 vs.  1986-90 
Government  Spending, 
1981-85 vs.  1986-90 
Net Lending vs. 
Net Lending Excl. 
Interest 
Net  Lending vs. 
Gross  Public Debt 
Net Lending  Excl. 
Interest vs.  Gross 
Public Debt 
Net Lending vs. 
Government  Spending 
Net Lending Excl. 
Interest vs.  Government 
Spending 
Gross  Public Debt vs. 
Government  Spending 
1981-85 
0.85 
(.0005) 
0.75 
(0.005) 
0.89 
(0.00) 
0.80 
(0.001) 
0.72 
(0.002) 
-0.82 
(0.001) 
-0.25 
(0.43) 
0.01 
(0.983) 
0.57  / 
(0.055) 
0.36 
(0.245) 
1986-90 
0.62 
(0.03) 
-0.81 
(0.001) 
-0.14 
(0.649) 
-0.09 
(0.779) 
0.14 
(0.665) 
0.30 
(0.354) 
Note:  All variables measured as  percentages  of GDP.  Upper  entries are  Spearman 
rank correlation coefficients.  Entries in parantheses are  the probability 
estimates  for t-tests that the correlation coefficient is zero. 
rankings  in fiscal performances  are very persistent over  time.  That  is,  a 
country that was  ranked highly in terms  of,  say,  its net lending ratio in the 
early 1980s  was  very likely to be  ranked highly in the  second half of this 
decade.  The  fifth row  of table  6  indicates  that countries with relatively high 
(low)  net lending ratios  tend to be  countries with relatively high  (low) 
primary net lending ratios.  The  fifth row  indicates that the  same  is true with 
regard to net lending ratios and gross public debt ratios. 
The  following  rows  of table  6  show  that there  is no  significant -23-
correlation between a  country(s  rank in primary net lending and its rank in 
gross public debt.  That is,  there is no  systematic link between relatively 
high  (low)  primary deficits and relatively high  (low)  debt  levels.  Furthermore 
there are  no  systematic relationships between relatively large deficits,  large 
primary deficits,  or large debt ratios and relatively large expenditure 
ratios.  Once  again,  this refutes  the  simple notion that large deficits or 
large debts  are  due  to excessive  spending. 
3.  Budgeting Procedures and Fiscal Outcomes:  Theory 
The  previous  section has  demonstrated the significant variation in the 
fiscal performance  of the  EC  member  countries  over  the past  two  or three 
decades.  Despite  the differences  in outcomes  it suggests  that fiscal policies 
in the  EC  were  mainly driven by shocks  common  to all countries.  The 
interesting question then is,  what explains  the  large differences  in their 
reactions? 
Economic  Models  of Fiscal  Performance 
Conventional  economic  analysis  dctes  not say much  about  the  determinants 
of fiscal performance.  It generally takes  fiscal policy as  exogenously 
determined by political processes.  One  strand of literature tries  to  explain 
the  secular growth of government  expenditures relative to  the  economy,  a 
tendency first formulated as  'Wagner's  Law'  (Wagner,  1890).  Although  the  link 
between economic  growth  and  the  relative size of government  expenditures, 
which Wagner  attributed to  the  growing responsibilities of government  in the 
process of industrialization,  seems  apparent for many  countries at first 
glance,  empirical studies generally found  no  or little support for  the  'Law' 
(e.g.  Larkey et al.,  1981;  Cameron,  1978).  Other attempts at generalizing 
empirical observations have  been equally unsuccessful  to withstand closer -M-
statistical scrutiny. 9 
Another line of research attempts  to  identify fiscal policy reaction 
functions  linking fiscal variables  such as  expenditures or deficits to macro 
economic variables,  such as  growth or unemployment.  Roubini  and Sachs  (1989a) 
estimate expenditures  and revenues  reaction functions  for  15  OECD  governments. 
They find that expenditure ratios,  on average across  the  OECD,  respond 
negatively to output growth  and positively to rising unemployment  rates; 
revenue-to-GOP  ratios respond negatively to output  growth  and negatively to 
unemployment  rates.  They  conclude  that the  slowdown  in economic  growth  and the 
rise in unemployment after the first oil price shock in 1973  were  responsible 
for  the  subsequent rise in government expenditures relative to  GDP. 
Roubini  and Sachs's  argument would suggest,  however,  that the rise in 
expenditures  explains much  of the deterioration of budget deficits  in the 
1970s.  Earlier,  we  saw that this simple relationship is not confirmed by ~ur 
data.  Since their estimated reaction functions  are  the  same  across  countries, 
differences  in the observed outcomes  would have  to be  due  to differences  in 
the  economic  shocks  individual  governments  were  reacting to,  which~is not 
consistent with our earlier observations,  either.  Even if different reaction 
functions  were  estimated,  their approach  leaves  the  question of why  such 
different reactions occurred unanswered. 
The  same  authors  (1989b)  take  a  step in a  different direction,  linking 
fiscal performance  to political characteristics.  They  argue  that government 
deficits relative to  GDP  have  been largest in OECD  countries with relatively 
unstable  governments.  More  specifically,  while  the post-1973  slowdown  in 
economic  growth  and rise in unemployment  explain the rise in expenditure and 
deficits in the  OECD,  they find that "multi-party coalition governments, 
especially those with a  short expected tenure,  are poor at reducing budget 
deficits"  (ibid.,  p.  922).  Roubini  and Sachs  propose  three intuitive -25-
explanations  for  this  finding:  The  diversity of interests and constituencies 
of coalition partners,  a  tendency of coalitions to be  status-quo biased,  as 
individual coalition members  can block changes  from  the status  quo  but cannot 
organize  enough  support to push  through a  change  from it,  and  a  lack of 
enforcement mechanisms  for cooperative behavior - which,  by assumption,  would 
foster fiscal discipline - in short-lived coalitions. 
Roubini  and Sachs's argument is,  however,  not entirely _convincing.  Their 
view of unstable  governments  presupposes  that individuals or parties take 
office for  a  short time  and  then disappear  from  the  government sphere. 
Commitment  to  longer-run oriented policies does  not pay off for  such 
politicians,  hence  their unwillingness  to  combat deficits  and avoid the 
accumulation of future  tax liabilities through  the creation of public debt. 
However,  even if governments  change  relatively frequently,  it may  still be 
true that the members  of_  government  are  drawn  from a  pool .o-f.  candidates  .. or 
parties which  does  not  change  much  over  time.  In such an environment, 
commitment  to  longer-run goals  does  pay off,  because  government politicians 
can expect that they or their party will have  another  turn in the  future. 
While  Roubini  and Sachs's data suggests  that countries with large deficits 
tend to have  unstable  governments,  it does  not  show  that countries with small 
deficits exhibit more  government stability than others.  This  suggests  the 
importance  of other,  omitted political characteristics. 
Political Economy  of Budgeting  Procedures 
Recent politico-economic literature has  explored the  role of 
institutional arrangements  governing the budgeting process,  voting 
arrangements  and  commitment  mechanisms  for fiscal performance.  Although this 
literature is heavily  influenced by  the peculiarities of the U.S.,  there are 
general  lessons  to  infer  from  this research.  The  most  important one  is that - 26  --
institutional structures,  i.e.,  the arrangements  assigning the roles 
individual participants play and  the  scope  and sequence  of decisions,  have 
important effects on  the final  outcomes  of the  budgeting process.  Here,  we 
review some  of the main arguments. 
In the most primitive  form  of a  budgeting process,  budgets would be 
voted by parliament after a  general debate  in which  each member  of parliament 
submit can proposal.  Arrow's  (1963)  well-known  Impossibility Theorem  implies 
that such a  procedure  does  not generally lead to  an equilibrium outcome.  Only 
under restrictive conditions  on the preferences of the  members  of parliament 
does  a  majority rule  induce  an equilibrium.  Of course,  such is not  the 
practice of actual budgeting procedures.  In practice,  budgeting procedures are 
divided between government  or parliamentary committees  drafting a  proposal, 
parliament which may  amend  the proposal subject to certain restrictions and 
_  pass it, and_ again .the  executi  v.e  carrying out the budget  .law~  .The  p.o.li tico-
economic  literature focuses  on how  the specific institutional arrangements 
affect the existence and the properties of the equilibrium outcome. 
Shepsle  (1979a,  b)  distinguishes  three characteristics of budgeting 
procedures.  The  division of labor arrangement assigns  individual actors  in the 
process  to specific roles.  For  example,  a  typical  European arrangement is that 
government  drafts  a  budget proposal  to be presented to  the  legislature. 10  The 
arrangement  may  be  that the proposal  is drafted by all cabinet members 
together or  in bilateral talks between the  finance  (or  treasury)  minister and 
the various  spending ministers.  In the U.S.,  in contrast,  the division of 
labor arrangement is a  system of parliamentary appropriations  committees.  A 
specialization of labor arrangement is an assignment of jurisdictions to 
individual groups  of actors.  A committee  may  have  jurisdiction over only one 
dimension or several dimensions  of government  services.  Spending ministers 
usually only have  jurisdiction over their own  field.  Finally,  an amendment -27-
control rule specifies what  type of amendments  the legislature may  bring up 
against the budget proposal.  Shepsle considers  four  types  of amendment  rules. 
Under  an open rule,  all amendments  are permissible.  Under  a  closed rule, 
parliament can only agree  or disagree,  in which case  a  fall-back budget is 
edopted,  e.g.,  the previous  one.  Under  a  boundary rule,  amendments  cannot make 
budget parameters  exceed or fall short of certain limits.  Finally,  under  a 
germaneness  rule,  only  such  amendments  can be  considered which pertain to  the 
matter currently under discussion. 
The  importance of the division of labor arrangement is that it 
determines  the  agenda setter for  the  subsequent steps of the budget procedure, 
i.e.,  the  agent presenting proposals  for budget changes  over  the status quo. 
This  is  important,  because  the proposed changes will depend  on  the preferences 
of the  agenda setter.  If amendments  are restricted,  the  agenda setter can 
condition the  outcome  of the,process by  the  choice of a  proposal.  The 
speci-Rlizatiotl of labor arrangement  is crucial because it determines  what kind 
of choices  the  agenda setter can make.  In the simplest case,  where  each 
committee has  jurisdiction over  only one  budget  dimension,  its choices  are 
limited to  a  mere  'more  or less'  of the relevant variable.  In contrast,  if the 
committee  has  jurisdiction over more  than one  dimension,  its choices  can 
involve  trade-offs  among  the  relevant activities.  Finally,  the  amendment 
control rule determines  the  power  the  agenda setter has  relative to  the 
legislatur~.  The  more  restrictive the  rule,  the  more  the  legislature is bound 
by ·the proposal;  under  an  open amendment  rule,  the situation is equivalent  to 
the primitive budgeting procedure  described above. 
Shepsle's work  generates  a  number  of  important  insights.  First, 
appropriate  institutional structures generate equilibrium outcomes  under 
fairly general assumptions  about  the agents'  preferences,  and,  in particular, 
in situations  in which  no  equilibrium exists  in the primitive set-up.  This -28-
underlines  the  importance  of institutional arrangements  for  fiscal  outcomes. 
Second,  the characteristics of the particular equilibrium outcome  depends  on 
the  combination of all three institutional characteristics.  This  implies  that 
different institutional set-ups  among  the  EC  countries may  explain different 
reactions  to  the  same  underlying shocks.  Third,  the status  quo will be most 
powerful  in determining  the  outcome,  if there is a  one-to-one  mapping between 
parliamentary committees  and jurisdictions,  and if the legislature is bound by 
a  rule that prohibits  amendments  if the  committee proposes  the status quo. 
Thus,  regardless of whether  or not the  government is formed  by  a  stable 
coalition - which would determine  the  assignment of individuals  to committees 
or ministries but would not  the affect budgeting procedure  - institutional 
structures are  important determinants  of how  likely a  deviation from  status 
quo  will be. 
DivisioiL and, specialization o.£  labor arrangements _to:gether  determine  the 
degree  of centralization of the budgeting process.  In the  European context,  we 
distinguish,  within government,  between a  decentralized approach,  in which 
each spending minister with authority over  one budget  dimension is engaged  in 
bilateral talks with the  finance  or treasury minister,  and  a  centralized 
approach,  in which  the cabinet as  a  whole  discusses  the budget proposals.  In 
the parliamentary procedure,  the  relevant distinction is between a  sequence  of 
votes proceeding on an  item-by-item basis,  or  a  general vote  on  the entire 
budget  following  a  general debate.  The  importance  of this aspect  comes  from 
the  limits it puts  on universalism and reciprocity  (Alt  and Chrystal,  1981). 
Universalism refers  to  the property of budget proposals  to  'contain something 
for  everyone',  i.e.,  to distribute favors  more  generously than an individual 
decision maker would want.  Reciprocity refers  to  the principle of not 
attacking another person's appropriation proposal  in return for her not 
attacking one's  own.  Both  tend to  increase expenditures. (5) 
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Chrystal  and Alt summarize  the basic argument  asfollows:  Consider  a 
government where  each spending minister pursues  only his  individual  interest 
and  the budget  law requires  a  minimal  winning coalition within the cabinet. 
Under  such circumstances,  it is always  rational for  a  minister to vote against 
other ministers'  proposals  for  increasing their budgets  on cost-benefit 
grounds.  By  implication,  no minister is able to push  an expansion of his 
budget  through and  government settles on the cheapest possible budget, 
although each minister would like a  larger one.  One  way  to get around this is 
to  engage  in mutual  agreements,  i.e.,  proposals which benefit more  than one 
minister,  or to  agree  tacitly not  to vote  down  each others'  proposals.  The 
result is that each spending minister obtains  a  larger budget.  Chrystal  and 
Alt argue  that pairwise bargaining between the  finance minister and  the 
spending minister favors  universalism and reciprocity.  They base  their view on 
reports  that British Cabinet ministers refrain.from  att~cking spending 
requests  from other departments  and  the  observation that the British system 
does  embed  pairwise bargaining.  Beyond that empirical observation,  however, 
their argument  seems  implausible.  Tacit agreements  require monitoring to be 
effective,  which  is easier in multilateral bargaining situations  than in 
decentralized ones,  because  the  former  give all participants the  opportunity 
to  observe  each others'  behavior.  Furthermore,  universalism requires  the 
possibility to  decide  over multiple budget  dimensions  simultaneously,  which 
would  typically not be  possible  in a  decentralized setting.  We  will 
hypothesize,  therefore,  that both practices are  more  limited in decentralized 
than in centralized procedures. 
Ferejohn and Krehbiel  (1987)  analyze  the  importance  of the  sequence of 
decisions  in the  budgeting process  for  the final  outcome.  Specifically,  they 
compare  a  process  in which  appropriations  are voted individually and  the 
overall budget size is a  residual with  one  in which  the  budget size is voted -30-
first and  the structure of the budget is determined afterwards,  given the 
total size.  Contrary to popular belief,  the latter procedure  does  not always 
lead to  a  smaller budget  than the first.  When  voting on  the  total size, 
decision makers  anticipate the  limits  they create for  subsequent allocations. 
Decision makers  with strongly skewed preferences  in favor  of particular budget 
items  are likely to produce larger budgets  in the  two-step  procedure,  because 
they do  not accept the  implicit need to  trade off individual expenditures  in 
the  second step.  In contrast,  decision makers  with more  balanced preferences 
are likely to find smaller budget agreements  in this way. 
Mackay  and Weaver  (1979)  show  that,  again contrary to popular belief, 
committees with the power  to propose budgets  for particular government 
services  do  not always  propose  a  larger budget  than the median voter would 
propose,  even if the committee  members'  preference for  the particular service 
are much  stronger than the median voter's preference.  Applying their  a~gument 
to  Europe,  this means  that proposals put forth by  spending ministers  do  not 
necessarily aim at larger spending for  their jurisdiction than proposals 
resulting from  a  general debate. 
North  and Weingast  (1989)  analyze  the  role of British fiscal 
institutions  introduced after the Glorious  Revolution of 1688.  The  new  fiscal 
constitution resulted in a  specific division of labor between the  Crown, 
Parliament,  and  the  Bank  of England and created an effective commitment 
mechanism  for  the  Crown  to  serve  its debt obligations.  Comparing public 
finances  in Britain before  and after the Revolution suggests  that these 
changes  facilitated a  more  stable and reliable fiscal policy.  Bordo  and White 
(1992)  compare  British and  French public  finances  between 1790  and 1814  and 
conclude  that institutional deficiencies  in the  French system undermined  the 
credibility of the  French government  and forced France  to  conduct 
significantly less efficient and stable fiscal policies  than Britain during -31-
that period. 
A Simple  Model  of the  Budgeting Process 
According  to Wildavsky  (1975,  p.  4)  the budget process  is  a  mechanism 
through which political interest groups  "bargain over conflicting goals,  make 
side-payments,  and try to motivate  one  another  to  accomplish their 
objectives".  In essence,  it is a  device  for political conflict resolution.  In 
this section,  we  propose  a  simple model  characterizing the budgeting process 
as it is  found  in the  EC  countries,  and derive  some  hypotheses  concerning 
fiscal discipline. 
Our  model  describes  the budgeting process  in three stages.  On  the first 
stage,  government  prepares  a  budget draft to be presented before parliament. 
The  government  comprises  spending ministers,  a  finance  or treasury minister 
. presidi~g over financial  resources,  and a  prime minister .acting as  the 
chairman. 11  Conflicts of interest between the ministers must be  resolved in 
the drafting process.  On  the  second stage,  the budget is submitted to 
parliament,  which  can amend  the proposal  and either pass  or reject it.  We 
think of this primarily as  a  bargaining process between government,  which  now 
represents  a  unified position expressed in its proposal,  and  the parties 
represented in parliament,  which either support or oppose  the  government.  On 
the  third stage,  the budget  law is executed and further modifications of the 
law may  be possible. 
To  characterize  the process,  we  assume  that  taxes  are not  earmarked for 
special purposes.  Spending ministers  are  interested in expanding  the  resources 
of their own  ministries,  but indifferent about  the  resources  of other 
ministries.  Their political success  is measured  in terms  of the  size of their 
budgets.  In contrast,  the prime minister and  the  finance  minister are not 
bound by particular interests - or not  to  the  same  extent - and,  therefore, -32-
are more  constraint by considerations of general public welfare  than the 
spending ministers.  For  a  given amount of total spending,  increasing the 
general  tax burden of the  economy  reduces  public welfare. 
Spending  and  financing  government  programs  involve different time 
horizons.  We  assume  that the benefits  from  spending money  for  the majority of 
government programs  are obtained immediately or over  a  relatively short  time 
period.  In contrast,  the welfare effects of higher  taxes  imposed  on current 
tax payers are felt to  a  large extent only in the  medium  and  long run,  since 
they  involve private sector adjustment  to  changes  in tax incentives or net 
asset returns.  In addition,  we  assume  that tax payers  are at least partly non-
Ricardian,  so  that deficit financing allows  to shift part of the  tax burden to 
finance  current expenditures  on  future  tax payers. 12  Finally,  we  assume  that 
politicians discount the  future,  so  that present or near pay-offs of their 
actions are weighed more  heavily than those  in the  more  distant future. 
Spending ministers are  inherently biased to push for  increased spending 
of their own  ministries,  since  the  resulting taxes  or deficits to  finance  the 
extra expenditure fall  on  the  general public  (or,  in the  case of deficits,  on 
the  general public  in the  future),  while  the  spending benefits their own 
constituency and raises their  poli~ical support.  A budget conflict between  two 
spending ministers,  A and  B,  therefore,  has  the structure described in fig.  9. 
Here,  we  compare  two  basic strategies:  small  and large expenditures.  If both 
choose  small  expenditures,  the  resulting level of taxes  and  the deficit remain 
small,  if both choose  large  expenditures,  taxes  and  the deficit are  large. 
Both  spending ministers  receive  the  same  pay-offs - denoted by  the  numbers  in 
the upper left corner for A and the  lower right corner for  B,  when  they adopt 
the  same  strategy.  Each would prefer an outcome  in which  the other chooses  the 
small expenditure size.  However,  because  a  minister faces  a  loss of political 
support if his colleague  reaps  a  larger allocation within a  given budget  than Ministry A 
strategies 
small 
expenditures 
large 
expenditures 
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Figure  9: 
Ministry B strategies 
small expenditures 
40 
low  taxes,  small 
deficit 
60 
medium  taxes, 
medium  deficit 
40 
20 
large 
expenditures 
20 
medium  taxes, 
medium deficit 
60 
50 
high taxes,  large 
deficit 
50 
he  does,  the  equilibrium is  the  large budget with high  taxes  and  a  large 
deficit.  That is,  the  spending bias works  against fiscal discipline. 
The  prime minister and  the  finance minister have  a  larger tendency to 
limit spending in order to restrain the  level of present and future 
taxation. 13  From  their perspective,  the preferred outcome  would be  that both 
spending ministers  adopt  the  small-expenditures strategy,  especially so  in 
times  where  the  'status-quo'  budget has high levels of spending and  taxation 
and  a  high deficit to begin with. 
An  important aspect of the process within government  concerns  the 
sequence  of decisions  determining  the size of the budget.  In a  'bottom-up' 
approach,  the  total size is determined residually after collecting spending 
requests  from all ministries.  Alternatively,  the cabinet may  agree  on a 
general constraint,  first,  and  decide  on  individual allocations or  the 
structure of the budget given this constraint afterwards.  The  general 
constraint may  fix  the overall size of the budget,  total expenditures or the 
deficit,  or consist of a  'golden rule'  clause,  i.e.,  the provision that 
deficits cannot  exceed  investment or capital expenditures.  Constraints  fixing 
only  the deficit or a  golden rule clause would,  however,  be  less binding for -~-
future  decisions  than total expenditures or the overall size.  A general 
constraint can be  strengthened against universalism and  reciprocity by giving 
the prime minister  (or  the  finance minister)  the authority to  fix  the overall 
size before individual budgets  are determined. 
Another characteristic of the process within government  concerns  the 
participation in decisions.  Budget decisions  may  be  reached by  the entire 
cabinet collectively,  or,  alternatively,  through bilateral discussions between 
the  finance minister and  each of the  spending ministries.  Finally,  we  can 
distinguish budget processes by  the  extent  to which  they connect  the current 
budget to past and future budgets  through multi-period budget plans.  If multi-
period budget plans exist at all,  they may  be  regarded primarily as  a  general 
orientation or as  a  binding constraint. 
The  government's  budget proposal is submitted to parliament where it 
becomes  subject to another bargaining process .. Members  of parliament represent 
local or other constituencies  and are,  therefore,  characterized by a  similar 
if not stronger - spending bias as  spending ministers.  On  the other hand, 
members  of parliament are bound by party discipline.  European parties,  which 
are collections of groups  of constituencies,  are likely to give  larger weight 
to  the  general  interest - as  opposed to particular constituencies - in party 
decisions  than individual members  of parliament would  do  in the  absence  of 
party discipline.  Furthermore,  for  the members  of the party or  the parties 
backing the  government  in office,  party discipline entails voting to support 
the  government,  even if the  outcome  does  not fully match  the preferences of 
the  individual member  of parliament. 
Parliament's  role is to  amend  the budget proposal,  and  to pass  or to 
reject it. While  government sets the  agenda  for  the parliamentary debate,  its 
proposal will anticipate parliament's  reaction to it. The  relationship between 
government  and parliament is characterized,  first,  by  the  scope  of amendments -35-
parliament can consider.  In the simplest case,  there may  be  no  restrictions on 
amendments  at all.  Otherwise,  amendments  may  only be permitted for certain 
parts of the budget,  or parliament may  be  restricted to  amendments  proposing 
increases  in expenditures  only if they identify the necessary sources  of 
additional  finance,  or only such  amendments  that do  not  (or only negatively) 
affect the overall size of the budget. 
The  second dimension of the  relationship between parliament and 
government  concerns  the political implications of rejecting the budget  favored 
by  the  government.  The  strategic effect of the possibility to reject the 
budget proposal  is two-fold.  On  the  one hand,  the  more  likely a  rejection 
leads  to  the  demise  of the  government,  the more  it is in government's  interest 
to propose  a  budget  that can be  expected to find a  solid majority in 
parliament.  This  tends  to weaken  the position of government  in the process.  On 
the other hand, . members  of .the _par..ties .supporting .gov.ernment .in parliament 
will refrain from  proposing changes  to  the budget proposal if doing so  may 
entail the fall of the  government,  unless  the  changes  are  regarded of outmost 
importance.  This  second effect tends  to strengthen government's position in 
the process.  While  the  combined effect is ambiguous,  we  assume  that the latter 
effect prevails. 
Another  dimension of the  relationship between  government  and parliament is 
the quality of information the budget proposal  conveys  about public finances 
and  government's  intentions.  A  low  degree of informativeness  allows  government 
to  send mixed signals about its fiscal  intentions,  making parliament's  task of 
monitoring  the budget more  difficult.  At  the  same  time,  the  informativeness of 
the budget  also determines  the  degree  to which  the budget  can be monitored 
effectively by political forces  outside parliament,  e.g.  the media. 
Voting procedures within parliament can be  characterized by  the order 
and  scope  of the votes.  As  within government,  they determine  the extent to -36-
which  reciprocity and universalism can prevail.  Parliament may  debate  and then 
vote  on the entire budget in one  step.  Alternatively,  it may  discuss  and vote 
on  the budget  item by  item,  possibly followed by  a  general vote  on the budget 
as  a  whole.  Finally,  parliament may  first vote  on  the overall budget size and 
then debate  and vote over  the  individual  items.  We  conjecture that the latter 
approach is most  conducive  to fiscal discipline,  while  the first approach is 
most  likely to result in large budgets  and large deficits. 
The  third stage of the budget procedure contains  the  execution of the 
budget  law under  the control of government.  During  the  execution new  demands 
for  spending or reduced taxation occur in response  to unforeseen economic 
events,  as well  as  discrepancies between planned and actual revenues  and 
expenditures.  As  in the drafting process,  we  assume  that,  for  their political 
interests,  spending ministers are more  likely to give  in to  demands  for 
increased  spendi~g. and more .prone  to  overrunni~g the  limits set by  the budget 
law  than the prime minister or the  finance minister.  Two  conflicting forces 
become  important:  the degree  to which  the budget  law binds  government's 
actions during the  fiscal year,  and  the  degree of flexibility to  respond to 
unforeseen events.  How  binding the budget  law is for  government  depends  on  the 
possibility to propose  supplementary budgets  during the  fiscal year,  on the 
relative  importance of open-ended appropriations  in the budget,  such as  social 
security or unemployment  compensation commitments,  and  on  the  power  of the 
finance minister  to  impose  spending limits on ministries which  exceed their 
budget norms.  The  degree  of flexibility in the  execution of the budget  depends 
on  the possibility to transfer expenditures between budget titles,  the 
existence of a  budget reserve,  and  the possibility to carry unused funds 
forward. (6) 
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The  Long-term Constraint Hypothesis  and  the Structural Hypothesis 
Our  model  predicts that the structure of interests among  spending 
ministers  and members  of parliament,  patterns of decision making  and voting 
conducive  to universalism and reciprocity,  and a  large degree of flexibility 
in the  execution of the budget all generate  a  bias for  outcomes with large 
expenditures,  high taxes  and large deficits.  Conversely,  institutional 
arrangements  limiting these  forces  should be  conducive  to greater fiscal 
discipline.  We  pursue  this general proposition in two  versions.  The  first 
version borrows  an  insight  from  the literature on  time  consistency of policy 
making. 14  We  conjecture that policy makers  are more  inclined to  adopt fiscal 
discipline when  they consider the general,  long-run trends  and consequences  of 
their policies,  than when  they are engaged in bargaining over details of the 
budget or  in the budget execution in their daily actions.  Policy makers  who 
are able  to  agree  on and announce  a  long-run program of fiscal stability will 
be  tempted to deviate  from  that program once  its implementation is under way, 
because  such deviations  serve short-run political interests.  This  suggests 
that strong institutions enforcing long-run orientation of fiscal policies are 
conducive  to fiscal stability.  This  is our 
LONG-TERM  CONSTRAINT  HYPOTHESIS:  The  more  budgetary decisions  are  tied to  a 
multi-period fiscal program,  the greater the  degree  of fiscal stability 
achieved. 
The  second hypothesis  focuses  on the  structure of negotiations  and decision 
making procedures  during  the budgeting process  and  the  execution of the budget 
law.  We  call it the 
STRUCTURAL  HYPOTHESIS:  Budgeting procedures  lead to greater fiscal discipline 
if they give  a  strong prerogative  to  the  prime minister or the  finance 
minister,  if they limit universalism,  reciprocity,  and parliamentary 
amendments,  and facilitate strict execution of  the budget  law. -38-
In the next section,  we  develop empirical tests of these hypotheses 
using data for  the  European  Community. 
4.  Budgeting Procedures in the EC:  A Characterization 
The  data for  the  following characterization of the national budgeting 
procedures  in the  EC  are based on an assessment of information on national 
procedures provided by  the  European Commission. 15  This  information was 
available for all member  governments,  although  in varying degrees  of detail. 
No  indication of the  ranks  of the experts within their ministries was  made. 
The  advantage  of this data base  over  the alternative of studying each 
country's relevant legal code  is that the  information reflect current 
practices,  not simply legal norms.  This  is particularly important  for  a 
country like the U.K.,  where  many  of the procedures  depend on  a  common 
understanding of the actors  rather than codified law  (Wildavsky, ·.1975).  Of 
course,  this advantage  is achieved at the  expense of subjectivity in the 
assessment.  Our  data base  does  not generally indicate changes  in the national 
procedures  in the past. 
Tables Al -AS  summarize  the assessments. 16  Table Al  begins with a 
general characterization of the  levels of government  in each country.  Levels 
of government vary between  two  and four.  Social security systems  are  treated 
as  a  separate entity within the  general  government  in most  countries.  The 
third column of this table characterizes  the budgetary status of lower-level 
governments.  Only  Denmark  and France have  regional  governments  subject to  a 
binding balanced-budget constraint;  in Belgium,  Luxembourg,  and Greece  such 
constraints exist but are not considered to be binding.  Lower-level 
governments  in Germany,  the Netherlands  and  the U.K.  are subject  to  a  'golden 
rule'  .  In four countries,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Greece,  and Italy,  regional 
governments  are  required to obtain authorization for borrowing  from  the -39-
general  government.  In four countries,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Portugal,  and 
Spain,  lower-level  governments  are  autonomous  in their budget plans,  in all 
other countries this autonomy  is limited,  or  lower~level governments  can be 
placed under  the surveillance of higher-level governments.  The  final  column 
shows  that the central government's budget is drafted,  in most  member  states, 
by  a  single ministry,  the exceptions being Denmark,  Greece,  Italy,  and 
Portugal. 
Table  A2  reviews  the  existence and strength of multi-annual budget 
plans.  Belgium,  France,  Greece,  Luxembourg,  Spain,  and Portugal  do  not specify 
any multi-annual budget  targets at all.  However,  with  the  exception of 
Belgium,  these countries  do  use  some  form  of multi-annual projections as 
intertemporal guidelines of their budget plans.  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  and 
the Netherlands  use  the overall size of the budget as  a  multi-period target. 
The  commitment  to  these  targets is political,  i.e  .. ,.  it is not binding,. but 
expresses political preferences  and  the willingness  to make  significant 
efforts to  come  close  to  these  targets.  Only  in the Netherlands  is the multi-
annual  target part of the coalition agreement of the  government.  Denmark  and 
the U.K.  have  more  specific multi-annual targets,  such as  total government 
revenue  or expenditures.  In Denmark,  these  targets are only indicative,  i.e., 
they carry less weight  than a  political commitment.  The  same  is  true for 
revenue  and public sector borrowing  targets  in the U.K.,  there,  however,  the 
spending target is a  political commitment. 
Table  A3  characterizes  the  rules  for preparing the budget draft.  Here, 
the existence of a  'general constraint'  indicates  that the draft begins with 
the  statement of overall parameters  such as  total spending,  revenues, 
deficits,  or government  debt.  Belgium,  Greece  and Portugal operate under  no 
effective general constraint,  the  Netherlands  and  Portugal  introduced their 
constraints  only recently.  Of  the  remaining countries,  Denmark,  France, -40-
Germany,  Luxembourg,  and  the U.K.  observe  spending targets  in the draft;  the 
same  countries except Luxembourg plus  Ireland observe  a  deficit target; 
France,  Ireland and Italy also have  constraints  on  government  debt 
outstanding.  Government  guarantees  to non-government entities are generally 
not  included in the budget;  if they are,  they enter as  a  total  (France),  an 
estimated spending amount  (Italy),  or a  maximum  (Portugal).  Seven of the 
twelve  government budgets  do  not  include  reserve  funds;  the  French reserve 
fund is of very limited size.  In contrast,  Greece,  Italy,  Portugal,  and  the 
U.K.  carry reserve  funds  on the budget.  Special  funds  exist in all member 
countries,  they are usually included in the budget at least to  some  extent or 
annexed to it. Finally,  the budget is proposed in one  comprehensive  document 
in most countries.  Exceptions  are  the U.K.  and  Ireland,  where  revenues  and 
expenditures  are presented in different documents,  while  in Italy and Greece 
.s.eparate  documents  are drafted for different policy domains. 
Table  A4  reviews  the  informativeness  of the budget.  It begins with an 
overall judgement,  ranging  from  transparent  (France,  Germany,  Greece  and the 
U.K.)  to  'hardly transparent'  (Italy).  Expenditures  are generally broken down 
by function and administrative responsibility;  Ireland,  Italy,  and  the 
Netherlands being  the  exceptions.  Revenues  are presented in a  breakdown by 
source  in all countries.  Only  in Germany,  the U.K.,  the Netherlands,  and 
France  (though  in a  separate statement)  can expenditure  and  revenue  categories 
be  linked directly to national accounting statistics to facilitate the 
assessment of their macro-economic  effects.  Loans  extended by  the  government 
are generally reported,  although in some  cases  (Germany,  Ireland and Greece) 
only in separate statements.  Most  countries use  a  consistent accounting base 
in their budget  documents  (either cash or transactions);  only Italy and 
Belgium use  mixed accounting bases.  Table  AS  considers  the  importance  of off-
budget activities by looking at the budgetary treatment of special funds  at -41-
the  government.  Greece,  Italy,  and,  until recently,  Portugal  and Belgium 
appear  to use  special  funds  and off-budget activities extensively.  In all 
other countries,  off-budget operations  are very limited and special  funds  are 
either included in the budget,  or reported as part of it. 
Table  A6  characterizes  the voting procedures within government  and the 
legislature as  well  as  the  scope of actions  the latter has  available.  An 
'agenda',  i.e.  initial budget guidelines,  is set either by  the prime minister 
or the  finance  (or treasury)  minister  (Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Greece, 
Italy)  or by  the entire cabinet.  The  agenda  may  specify overall limits on  the 
budget size  (Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Spain,  U.K.),  limits on  spending or 
deficits  (Denmark,  Greece,  Ireland),  or determine specific budget targets 
together with one  of the  former.  Subsequent negotiations  are bilateral between 
the  spending ministries  and  the  finance ministry in Denmark,  France,  Germany, 
the  Netherlands~  Port~gal,  and  the U.K.,  multilateral in Italy and involve  the 
entire cabinet in Belgium,  Greece,  Ireland,  and Spain. 
Parliaments  generally do  not have  the  power  to make  budget proposals. 
The  only exceptions  are  Germany  and  Luxembourg,  even there,  this possibility 
is of no  practical  importance.  Amendments  are subject to various  restrictions. 
Unlimited amendments  are possible  in Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Greece,  the 
Netherlands  and Portugal.  In Denmark  and Spain amendments  must be offsetting 
in the  sense  that proposals  to  increase expenditures  in one budget title must 
be  accompanied by proposals  to  reduce  expenditure  in other titles,  or that a 
proposed  tax reduction must be  matched with an  increase  in another  tax.  The 
French rule  is  even stricter,  prohibiting proposals  to raise expenditures  in 
one  title and to  reduce  expenditures under another title.  Only  in Greece, 
Italy,  and Spain amendments  are not perceived to be  a  potential cause  for  the 
government  to fall. 
Parliaments  in Belgium,  Luxembourg  and Spain vote  on expenditures  and -~-
taxes  simultaneously.  In France,  existing entitlements are voted upon in a 
first,  general vote,  the  subsequent discussion on new  authorizations proceeds 
chapter by chapter.  In most  EC  countries,  the parliamentary debate  ends with a 
final,  global vote  on  the budget.  Only  in France  and  the  U.K.  such  a  vote is 
taken before  the parliamentary debate begins.  In the Netherlands,  a  general 
discussion on the  revenue  and expenditure  sides of the budget  opens  the 
parliamentary process,  but no  vote  is  taken.  Most  parliaments are subject to 
explicit time  limits by which  the budget must have  been passed.  Exceptions  are 
only Ireland,  the Netherlands,  and Spain.  Provisional budgets  are  implemented 
if the  time  limit is not met.  In most  cases,  the provisional budget is a 
prolongation of the previous budget  on a  monthly or  four-months  basis. 
Table A7  reports  the budget monitoring rules  during  the  execution 
process.  Supervision is generally the  task of the  finance ministry;  only in 
Denmark  and Germany  are  the  ~pendi~g ministers  responsible for monitoring 
their budgets.  The  French case is an  intermediate one,  where  the  finance 
ministry places  supervisors  in the  spending ministries.  Parliaments are 
generally informed about  the  execution on  a  monthly or quarterly basis,  but 
have  no  further role in the process.  In all countries except Belgium,  the 
final closure of the budget  occurs  during  the year  following  the  execution. 
Table  AS  summarizes  the provisions  governing  the  execution of the budget 
law and,  in particular,  the  degree  of flexibility governments  have at that 
stage  to react to unforeseen events or deviate  from  earlier plans.  Finance 
ministers  in France,  Germany,  Greece  and  Luxembourg  can block expenditures if 
budget  overruns  are  foreseen.  In these countries  and  Denmark,  Portugal  and the 
U.K.  spending ministries are subject to cash limits during the year,  imposing 
constraints  on  the  timing of expenditures.  Only  in Belgium,  France  and 
Germany,  spending ministers generally have  to obtain authorization for actual 
disbursements;  in the Netherlands  and Portugal,  this may  be  the  case -43-
occasionally. 
There  are various  degrees  of limitations to  transfering expenditures 
between chapters of the budget during the execution.  Transfers often require 
authorization by  the  finance  minister or the parliament.  The  German  and the 
Greek finance minister,  and  the  Dutch  government with  some  limitations,  may 
authorize  larger budget  changes;  in all other countries,  a  new budget  law is 
required and must be  passed under  the  same  rules  as  the original one.  In 
Belgium and Italy,  the  submission of supplementary budgets  during  the fiscal 
year is a  standard practice  (in March  or in June  and before October, 
respectively).  Carrying-over unused spending authorizations  to  the next fiscal 
year is generally allowed in Italy,  impossible  in Greece  and Ireland,  and 
subject to limitations  in the  other countries. 
_Construction of the  Long-term Constraint and  the Structural Indexes 
To  test our hypotheses  about  the  effect of institutional arrangements  on 
fiscal  outcomes,  we  need numerical  representations of the  institutional 
characteristics of the  12  countries.  Such  representations  can be  derived by 
constructing indexes  ranking  the budgeting procedures  according to  the 
relevant institutional properties.  For  this purpose,  we  select those 
characteristics  from  tables  Al  -AS,  which  generate  the  largest differences 
between institutional arrangements.  Considering  the  remaining  ones  would not 
add more  discriminating  information to  our  indexes,  but simply  increase  the 
index value  for all countries.  We  group  these characteristics under  five 
larger items:  the structure of negotiations within government,  the  structure 
of the parliamentary process,  the  informativeness  of the budget draft,  the 
flexibility of the budget execution,  and  the  longterm planning constraint.  For 
each characteristic,  we  use  numbers  ranging  from  zero  to  four  to describe its 
quality,  with  a  low  number  indicating a  quality conducive  to  a  small degree of -44-
fiscal discipline.  This  assures  that each characteristic will contribute 
equally to  the overall  indexes. 17  Where  the available  information was  not 
explicit about  the  relevant sub-item for  a  country,  we  assign a  number  equal 
to  the  average  of the  available numbers  for  the other characteristics of the 
same  item.  See  the appendix for  more  details. 
Next,  we  construct  two  sets of indexes.  The  structural indexes,  Sil -
SI3 pertain to  the  structural hypothesis  formulated  above.  A large structural 
index Sil signals  the  following properties of a  country's budgeting procedure: 
A strong position of the prime minister or finance minister in government  and 
government negotiations  evolving under  a  firm general constraint on  the size 
of the budget;  a  parliamentary process with strong limits on amendments,  votes 
proceeding item-by-item on expenditures  and a  global vote  on  the  total size of 
the budget preceding the parliamentary debate;  a  large degree of transparency 
of  .. the budget; - .. and an .execution proc.e.ss ~with limited  _f~exibilit:y  .. .and .a  strong 
position of the  finance minister vis-a-vis the  spending ministers.  Our 
structural hypothesis  says  that countries with a  large structural  index should 
be expected to exhibit a  relatively large degree of fiscal discipline. 
Computing  the  index Sil by  summing  up  the  sub-indexes  for  the  individual 
characteristics presumes  that these characteristics are substitutes for  each 
other in achieving the  same  degree  of fiscal discipline.  To  see how  important 
this substitutability assumption is,  we  compute  two  more  structural indexes by 
leaving out components  from  the overall index Sil.  Specifically,  index SI2 
drops  the  informativeness characteristics.  Index SI3  drops  these and  the 
flexibility characteristics of the budget execution.  Thus,  the  finding  that 
Sll is strongly related to  fiscal discipline while  SI2  is not would  indicate 
that the  informativeness  aspect is very  important relative to  the other 
aspects.  If Sil and  SI2  relate equally to fiscal discipline,  the 
informativeness  aspect would be  less  important than the  remaining 8
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characteristics. 
To  test the  importance  of the  long-term constraint,  we  construct the 
indexes  CONl  CON3  ·in a  similar matter.  We  conjecture that,  apart  from  the 
existence of a  multi-annual fiscal program,  a  high degree  of  informativeness 
of the budget facilitating its monitoring,  limited amendment  power of 
parliament and limited flexibility in the budget execution are  important  to 
make  the  long-term constraint effective.  Thus,  a  large value of CONl  indicates 
the existence of a  multi-annual fiscal target which  is seen as  a  strong 
political commitment  and is embedded  in a  consistent economic  forecasting 
framework;  a  large degree  of transparency of the budget;  limited amendment 
power  of parliament and  limited flexibility of the budget execution.  A large 
value of the  index  should signal  a  relatively high degree  of fiscal 
di-scipline.  As  before,  we  construct alternative  indexes  to assess  the_ implied 
substitutability ass~ptions.  CON2  leaves ·out· the transparency 
characteristics,  while  CON3  leaves  out transparency and  amendment  limits. 
Graphical  representations of all six indexes  are  shown  in figures  10  and 11. 
5.  Budgeting Procedures  and Fiscal Performance:  Empirical Tests 
We  now  turn to  testing our  two  main hypotheses  using nonparametric tests 
and regression analysis.  While  linear regression analysis  is more  familiar  and 
easier to  interpret,  nonparametric  tests  have  the  advantage  of not requiring 
the explicit specification of a  functional  form  of the  relationship between 
fiscal  outcomes  and  our  indexes  characterizing budgeting procedures,  which  is 
necessarily largely arbitrary.  Furthermore,  the nonparametric  tests have  more 
power  in the  small  sample  size we  are  confronted with. 
Table  7  presents  the  Spearman rank correlation coefficients between our 
indexes  and  gross  debt ratios,  net  lending ratios and primary  lending ratios 
for  the first and  the  second half of the  1980s.  Rankings  for  the  debt  and net -48-
lending ratios assign high  ranks  to relatively small  debt  ratios  and small 
deficits;  ranks  for  the  indexes  are high  for relatively large  indexes.  Table  7 
shows  that there are  strong positive rank correlations between  the structural 
indexes  and net lending ratios  throughout  the  1980s.  The  rank correlations 
between  the structural  indexes  and  the primary net lending ratio are strongly 
positive in the first half of the  1980s;  they maintain the anticipated 
negative  sign in the  later 1980s,  but are not large  enough  to be  significant. 
The  rank correlations between the structural  indexes  and  the  gross  debt ratio 
have  the anticipated positive sign in both subsamples,  but  they are 
significant only in the  second one.  Over all,  these  results  indicate that 
countries  ranking high  on  the structural  index - countries which,  under  the 
structural hypothesis  should exhibit relatively strong fiscal discipline -
rank high in debt ratios and net lending ratios.  This  is a  first empirical 
support for  our structural  ~ypothesis. 
Table  7  does  not,  however,  support  the  long-term constraint hypothesis. 
No  rank correlation between  the  longterm constraint  indexes  and  the debt and 
net  lending ratios are  significant;  some  even have  the  wrong  sign. 
Table  8  presents  the results of two  nonparametric  tests for  the 
structural  index.  To  perform  these  tests,  we  divided our  sample  into  the  group 
of four  countries with  the  largest values  of the structural  index,  another 
group  of four  countries with  the  four  smallest values,  and  the  group  of the 
remaining countries.  The  Null-hypothesis  for  these  tests  is  that the 
distribution of debt  and net  lending ratios  is  the  same  in all three  groups, 
hence  the  same  as  in the  combined group,  indicating that classification 
according to  the  indexes  does  not matter.  To  alleviate the degrees-of-freedom 
problem,  we  perform  these  tests not only for  the  two  subsamples  of the  1980s, 
but also for  a  combined  sample,  assuming  that the  effect of the budgeting 
procedures  is  the  same  in both subsamples.  Thus,  the  tests under  the  column -49-
'81-90'  use  24  observations of the debt and net lending ratios,  two  for  each 
country. 
Table  7:  Rank  Correlation Coefficients 
Gross  Debt/GDP  Net  Lending/GDP  Net Lending Excl. 
Interest/GDP 
period  period  period 
81-85  86-90  81-85  86-90  81-85  86-90 
Structural Hypothesis 
Sll  .42  .60**  .68**  .61**  .57**  .15 
SI2  .26  .SO*  .56*  .58**  .63**  .32 
SI3  .37  .60**  .67**  .71***  .71***  .26 
Long-term Constraint Hypothesis 
CONl  .15  .38  .39  .37  .31  -.19 
CON2  -. 11  06  11  24  25  -.01 
CON3  .;....26  -.10  -.03  .12  .12  -.02 
Note:  Table entries are  Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the 
structural  indeces  and  the  fiscal performance variables  and the  longterm 
constraint  index and  the fiscal performance variables,  respectively.  *,  **, 
and ***  indicate that  the correlation coefficient is significantly different 
from  zero at the  ten,  five,  and one  percent significance level. 
Table  8  strengthens  the  evidence  shown  in table  7.  We  find that the 
structural  index has  a  significant impact  on  the  debt ratio,  the net lending 
ratio,  and  the ratio of net lending excluding interest payments  to  GDP.  As  in 
table  7,  the results are  less strong when  the  two  subsamples  are  considered 
separately for  the  debt ratio and  the  ratio of net lending excluding interest 
payments,  however,  in the  combined  sample,  the  tests are  strongly significant 
for both.  The  implied relationship - not visible  in the  table - is as 
anticipated under  the structural hypothesis:  Countries with high  index values 
have  debt ratios  (net  lending ratios)  significantly more  concentrated around -50-
Table  8:  Hypothesis  Tests  for Structural  Index 
Gross  Debt/GDP  Net  Lending/GOP  Net  Lending Excl. 
Interest/GOP 
period  period  period 
81-85  86-90  81-90  81-85  86-90  81-90  81-85  86-90  81-90 
Kruskal  - Wallis  Test 
Sil  .12  .02  .00  .03  .02  .00  .12  .53  .01 
SI2  .74  .17  .16  .15  .OS  .01  .OS  .26  .00 
SI3  .06  .02  .00  .03  .02  .00  .09  ,70  .01 
van der Waerden Test 
Sll  .11  .03  .00  .03  .03  .00  .12  .45  .01 
SI2  .69  .20  .17  .20  .06  .01  ,06  .24  .00 
SI3  .06  .02  .00  .03  .03  .00  .10  .60  .09 
Note:  Both tests are Chi-square distributed under  the Null-hypothesis of no 
effect from bargaining and voting structure.  Table entries are  the marginal 
probabilities of a  larger than estimated  ~est statistic under  the  Null. 
Table  9:  Hypothesis  Tests  for  Long-Term  Planning Constraint 
Gross  Debt/GOP  Net  Lending/GOP  Net  Lending Excl. 
Interest/GOP 
period  period  period 
81-85  86-90  81-90  81-85  86-90  81-90  81-85  86-90  81-90 
Kruskal  - Wallis Test 
conl  .47  .39  .20  .20  .47  .11  .40  .87  .15 
con2  ...,,.,. 
.  I  ,  .78  .72  .94  .69  .69  .67  .78  .43 
con3  .66  .44  .25  .16  .35  .04  ,ll  .46  .01 
van der Waerden Test 
conl  .52  .44  .26  .21  .57  .19  .50  .94  .26 
con2  .80  .81  .72  .99  .75  .83  .73  .90  .54 
con3  .68  .49  .28  .15  .35  .04  .13  .49  .01 
Note:  Both tests are c  i-s uare  d1str1 uted under  the  Null-h·  q  YP othes1s  of no 
effect from  longterm planning contraint.  Table  entries are  the marginal 
probabilities of a  larger than estimated test statistic under  the Null. -51-
lower values  (around zero)  than countries with high  low  index values.  The 
results for  the gross  debt ratio,  where  Sil and  SI3  are significant,  while  SI2 
is not,  suggest that the characteristics pertaining to  the bargaining and 
voting structures in government  and parliament and the flexibility of 
execution are more  important  to determine  debt ratios  than the  informativeness 
of the budget.  In contrast,  the table  indicates that all three· indexes  are 
important for  the net lending ratios. 
Table  9  presents  the  corresponding test results for  the  indexes of long-
term constraint.  Here,  we  find only weak  evidence  that the constraint is 
effective:  Only  for  the net lending ratios and  the  index CON3,  which  comprises 
the characteristics of the  longterm planning constraint and  the flexibility of 
execution,  and only in the  combined sample  do  the tests indicate  a  significant 
role of the  longterm constraint in shaping fiscal  outcomes. 
, 
Table  10 presents  the results of estimating the  linear regression 
equation: 
(4) 
where  y1  is country i's debt ratio,  net lending ratio,  or primary net  lending 
ratio,  x1  is country i's structural  index  SI11  or  longterm constrain index 
CON11 ,  and u1  is a  regression error.  Table  10 presents  the  results of 
regressions  for  the  combined  subsamples.  Additional  regressions  testing for 
differences  in the coefficients between  these  two  subsamples  indicated no 
parameter  change  and are not  reported.  The  results for all three fiscal 
variables  and  the structural  index corroborate  our earlier findings.  The 
structural  index has  a  significant positive  impact  on  the net lending ratios 
and  a  significantly negative  impact  on  the  debt ratio.  These  results can be 
interpreted as  follows:  Implementing  a  structural reform of the budgetary 
process  in a  country which  increases  the structural  index by  25  points -52-
(approximately the difference between Belgium and  the Netherlands,  would 
result,  in the  long run,  in an increase  in the net lending ratio by about 4.75 
Table  10:  Regression Estimates 
Dependent  Const.  Sll  CONl  R2  RMSE  F 
Variable  (t-ratio)  (t-ratio)  (t-ratio) 
Net  Lending/GOP 
NL1  -12.72  0.19  0.34  3.94  0.003 
(-5.64**)  (3.39**) 
NL1  -11.88  0.21  0.19  4.38  I  0.034 
(-4.06**)  '  (2.26) 
NL1  -12.26  0.20  -0.05  0.35  2.52  0.04 
(-4.56**)  (2.25*)  (-0.33) 
Net  Lending Excl.  Interest /  GOP 
NLX1  -5.33  0.10  0.33  2.28  0.004 
(-4.09**)  (3.28**) 
NLX1  -4.81  0.12  0.18  2.52  0.04 
(-2.86**)  (2.17) 
NLX1  -5.04  0.12  -0.03  0.33  2.32  0.01 
(-3.24**)  (2.22*)  (-0.37) 
Gross  Debt I  GOP 
Bi  98.97  -0.93  0.24  26.6  0.02 
(6.50**)  (-2.60**) 
Bi  89.86  -0.94  0.09  28.94  0.14 
(4.65**)  (1.51) 
Bi  92.27  -1.28  0.69  0.25  26.90  0.04 
(5.12**)  (2.11*)  (0.72) 
Note:  *  and **  indicate significance of the  t-ratio at the  five  and one-
percent levels,  respectively.  F  is  the marginal probability of a  larger 
estimate of the  F-ratio under  the Null-hypothesis  that the  model  has  no 
explanatory power.  RMSE  is the  root mean  squared error. 
percent,  and the primary net lending ratio by about 2.5 percent,  while 
reducing the  debt ratio by  about  23  percent.  Additional  regressions  for  the 
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structural indexes  SI2  and SI3 yield similar results  and are not reported. 
They  did not indicate major differences  in the  importance of the  subindexes. 
The  regression results for  the  longterm constraint index are very 
different.  Here,  the  only significant coefficient is found  in the  model  for 
the net lending ratio.  The  index does  not,  in contrast,  explain variation in 
the  gross  debt ratio nor  the  ratio of net lending excluding interest payments. 
Furthermore,  the  third regression for  the net lending ratio,  which  combines 
both the structural  index and the  longterm constraint  index,  suggests  that the 
structural  index has  more  explanatory power,  since  the  longterm constraint 
index is not significant in this regression. 
6.  Conclusions 
This  paper  investigates  the  role of budgeting procedures  in determining 
a  country's  fiscal performance.  Recent  theoretical literature has  developed 
models  showing that the  institutional framework  in which budgeting takes 
places  can have  important  consequences  for  the  degree  of fiscal discipline 
achieved by  a  country.  We  analyze this basic proposition in two  versions,  one 
focusing  on structural characteristics of the budgeting procedures  and  the 
other focusing  on  the  importance  of a  longterm fiscal constraint.  The 
empirical analysis uses  data for  the  European  Community  countries  during  the 
1980s  and characterizations of their budgeting procedures  focusing  on current 
practices rather  than simply  on legal norms. 
Our  main result is that we  find strong empirical  support  for  our 
structural hypothesis.  Specifically,  our results suggest that a  budgeting 
process  that gives  the  prime  or finance  (or  treasury)  minister a  position of 
strategic dominance  over  the  spending ministers,  that limits  the  amendment 
power  of parliament,  and that leaves little room  for  changes  in the budget 
during the  execution process  is strongly conducive  to fiscal discipline,  i.e., -54-
relatively small deficits and public debt.  This  result can be  interpreted as 
pointing to  the  importance  of a  commitment  mechanism  in the budgeting process. 
Spending ministers  are exposed to political pressures  from  interest groups 
and,  since taxes fall on the general public while  expenditures benefit 
particular groups,  are biased in their decisions  towards  large expenditures 
and large deficits.  The  prime minister and  the  finance  or treasury minister, 
in contrast,  do  not depend on particular interest groups  to  the  same  extent; 
their decisions are more  strongly guided by general  economic  considerations.  A 
strong position of the prime minister or the  finance  (or treasury)  minister 
and limited parliamentary power  enable  the  government  to  commit  fiscal 
strategies limiting expenditures  and deficits and  to defend  these strategies 
against  the political pressures  for more  profligate policies which  spending 
ministers  and members  of parliament are exposed to  in the day-to-day political 
process. 
In contrast,  the  role of long-term fiscal constraints  in achieving 
fiscal discipline,  while  in most  cases positive,  is not  found  to be 
significant.  While  we  do  not conclude  from  this that long-term constraints 
lack importance,  our conclusion is that a  long-term constraint will only be 
effective if governments  have  an effective commitment  mechanism  in the 
budgetary process.  That  is,  a  long-term constraint may  improve  the fiscal 
performance of a  country with budgeting procedures  which  rank high on our 
structural  index,  but  the  long-term constraint alone  is insufficient to 
overcome  the  problems  of fiscal discipline for  a  country that ranks  low  on  the 
structural index. 
Our  results suggest  that institutional reform of the budgeting process 
is a  promising avenue  to achieve  a  larger degree of fiscal discipline.  Of 
course,  this is not  to  say that institutional reform can discipline political 
actors who  are  largely unwilling to accept less  spending,  higher  taxes,  or -55-
smaller deficits.  Our view is,  however,  that appropriate  institutional reforms 
can help  governments  and parliaments  to materialize  a  newly  reached consensus 
for greater fiscal discipline.  Such  reforms  may  be  required in some  countries 
to achieve  the fiscal  targets  spelled out recently in the Maastricht Accord, 
which can be  regarded as  a  special  form  of longterm constraints  on fiscal 
policies.  What  is more,  institutional reforms  meeting the  requirements  and 
particularities of individual member  countries may  be  a  promising route  to 
maintain fiscal stability in the  third stage of European Monetary Union as  a 
complement  to  the  imposition of uniform fiscal criteria under  the current 
institutional arrangements. -56-
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NOTES 
1.  For  review of this discussion see von Hagen  and Fratianni  (1991),  Fratianni 
and von Hagen  (1992). 
2.  Art.  3  of the  Protocol on the  Excessive Deficit Procedure  requires  that 
'the Member  States shall ensure  that national procedures  in the budgetary area 
enable  them  to meet  their obligatins  in this area deriving  from  this Treaty' . 
3.  Net  government  lending corresponds  to  the negative of the  general 
government deficit. 
4.  Net  lending excluding interest corresponds  to  the negative of the  'primary 
government deficit'. 
5.  More  specifically,  we  can calculate  the  transition probabilities  from  1971 
to  1990  as  follows: 
position in 
1971 
high 
low 
·total 
position in 1990 
high  middle 
3  1 
0  3 
3  4 
low  total 
1  5 
4  7 
·5  i2 
Thus,  the probability of being in the high-debt group  in 1990  for  a  country 
being in the high-debt  group  in 1971  is 60  percent,  the probability of being a 
low-debt  country in 1990  for  a  low-debt country in 1971  is 4/7. 
6.  Note  that the Greek  and Portuguese  data start only in the  1980s.  These 
countries  could therefore not be  included in the  estimation of the  common 
factors without  severe  losses of degrees  of freedom. 
7.  A variable xis said to  Granger-cause  a  variable y,  if including past 
values  of x  together with past values  of y  in a  forecast model  for  y  reduces 
the variance of the prediction error compared to  a  forecast model  that uses 
past values of y  alone. 
8.  In addition,  there  is some  weak  evidence  for Granger-causality for  the 
Netherlands,  Ireland,  and  Portugal. 
9.  see  Larkey at al.  (1981).  Among  these are  the  'Displacement Effect 
Hypothesis'  claiming that the  relative expansion of government  expenditures  is 
driven by  the  development  of government  revenues,  which  increase  relative  to 
GNP  in times  of social  turmoil  and are rigid downwards,  afterwards,  and 
hypotheses  about  the uncontrollability or stickiness of government 
expenditures  following  severe macro  economic  shocks. 
10.  Here  and ·subsequently we  use  the  term  government  in the  narrow sense of 
th~. cabinet of ministers. 
11.  Subsequently,  we  use  the  term  finance  minister exclusively  to describe 
this role. -59-
12.  Tax-payers  are said to be Ricardian if they do  not regard public debt as 
part of their net wealth and,  hence,  reduce  current consumption one-for-one 
with an  increase  in government deficits.  Ricardian tax-payers would carry the 
full tax burden of a  given amount  of government  expenditure regardless of 
whether it is tax-financed currently or deficit-financed and the  taxes  (plus 
interest)  are collected later.  see e.g.  Barra  (1974). 
13.  To  the extent that a  large budget  conveys  a  powerful  government,  they may 
have  a  preference  for  enlarging the budget size.  We  assume  that this  incentive 
is weaker  than their concern for  general interests. 
14.  see Kydland  and Prescott  (1977)  for  a  classical exposition of the  time 
consistency problem in economic  policy.  In the monetary policy context,  the 
time  consistency problem  - generally expressed as  the problem of central bank 
credibility  - has  been shown  to be  an  important  source of persistent inflation 
and is an  important justification for central bank  independence.  see Neumann 
(1991)  or Fratianni and von Hagen  (1992). 
15.  This  data was  partly obtained from  Member  States concerning their 
situation in 1991. 
16.  The  following  tables  compress  and  summarize  the  assessment of information 
on national budgeting procedures  and are prepared by  the present author.  They 
do  not reflect the  judgement nor  the  interpretation of the  European 
Commission. 
17.  Note  that this normalization implies  that some  index values  are not 
integers. -60-
Appendix:  Budgeting Rules  in the  European  Community  Countries 
Characterizations  and  Index Construction 
Abbreviations: 
B:  public debt 
D:  Deficit 
Depts:  Departments 
G:  Government  spending 
lim:  limited 
MF:  Ministry of Finance  (or Ministry of Treasury where  appropriate) 
Parl:  Parliament 
T:  Tax  revenues 
Y:  nominal  GDP 
·f1B:  net borrowin_g 
"Golden rule"  refers  to  the provision that the budget defict must  not exceed 
investment or capital expenditure. 
Sources:  Assessment of information on national procedures  obtained from  the 
European  Commission  in 1991,  OECD  (1987),  and  European  Commission 
(1983). -61-
Table  Al:  Structure of General  Government 
Country  Levels  of Government  Budgetary Status of Regional  Ministries  involved in 
Authorities  draft of overall balance 
Balanced  Borrowing  Planning 
Budget  Author- Autonomy' 
Required
1  ized2 
Belgium  3  + Social Security  y  y  s  Finance,  Budget 
Denmark  3  + Social Security  b  y  s  Finance,  Economic 
Affairs,  Revenues 
France  4  + Social Security  b  lim  Finance 
Germany  3  + Social Security  g•  n  s  Finance 
Greece  2  +  Public Entities  y  y  n  Finance,  National 
Economy  for  investment 
Ireland  2  n  n  y  Finance 
Italy  3  n  y  lim  Finance,  Treasury, 
Budget 
Luxembg.  2  + Social Security  y  n  y  Budget 
Netherlands  3  + Social Security  g  n  s  Finance 
Portugal  2  + Social Security  n  n  y  Budget,  Fiscal Affairs, 
Treasury-
Spain  4  + Autonomous  Regions  n  .n  y  Finance 
United Kingdom  2  g  n  lim  Treasury 
1  n:  no  requirement;  y:  requirement  exists but is not  considered binding;  b:  requirement is binding;  g: 
'golden rule'  requirement exists,  i.e., deficits must not  exceed  investment  expenditures. 
2  y:  Authorization  from higher  level government  is required;  n:  no  requirement. 
,  y:  lower-level governments  are  autonomous;  s:  they may  be placed under surveillance of higher-level 
government;  lim:  they have  limited  autonomy;  n:  they have no  autonomy. 
4  'Golden Rule'  applies,  i.e.,  deficits must  not  exceed  investment 
expenditures. -62-
Table A2:  Multi-Annual  Budget  Plans  or Targets 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembg. 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Portugal 
U.K. 
Target 
none 
G,  T 
none 
total 
budget size 
none 
total 
budget size 
total 
.budget siz.e 
none 
total 
budget size 
none 
none 
G,  T,  l1B 
Nature 
Estimates in current prices reflect long-term 
policies as  framework  for planning.  Targets 
change with political priorities,  demographic 
changes. 
Three-year projections of main  items  serves to 
clarify budget decisions.  Based on macro-
economic  scenarios revised several times  a 
year. 
Framework  for orientation of all interested 
parties.  Annually adapted to current economic 
situation on the basis of macroeconomic 
projection. 
Starting in 1990,  budget is seen as  part of 5-
year  economic  plan approved by Parliament.  For 
91  - 93,  budget is part of 3-year stabilization 
program. 
Estimates of fiscal developments  assuming no 
changes  in policies.  Baseline for decisions. 
Projections are based on macroeconomic 
forecasts  and  'known'  factors.  Spending 
departments must provide annual forecast of 
resource requirements with demands  for  funds. 
2  versions:  one on  a  no-change-in-ijolicies 
. basis and. one based on revisions of medium-term 
fiscal program.  The  latter contains 
macroeconomic  projections  and deficit targets. 
multi-annual plan in preparation 
Based on macroeconomir.  forecast updated bi-
annually.  Interpolations are made  in between 
updates  in light of new  commitments  and 
policies. 
ad hoc  macroeconomic  and budgetary scenarios. 
Budget  includes  indicative projections  for 
programs  and projects.  For  1991-95,  there is a 
reference  framework  for medium-term fiscal 
stabilization and adjustment to the  EC  average. 
Medium  term fiscal policy objectives for the 
year ahead are based on  macroeconomic  forecast. 
Following years  are based on  consistent 
assumptions  and  Government's  inflation 
objective. 
Period 
t+3 
t+2 
t+4 
t+4 
t+3 
t-1 to 
t+4 
5  years 
t+4 
t+4 
Degree of 
Commitment 
indicative,  base 
for  spending 
limits 
unpublished,  for 
internal use 
only 
political 
indicative, 
though in 
context with EC 
loan 
unpublished,  but 
political 
political 
strong 
political,  part 
of coalition 
agreement 
unpublished 
internal 
orientation 
indicative, 
currently 
political for 
DIY 
indicative for 
budget balance, 
political for G -63-
Table  A3:  Rules  for  Preparation of Budget  Draft 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembg. 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
U.K. 
general 
constraint 
double  norm  on 
expenditure 
and  deficit 
(avoidable) 
G,  D 
D/Y,  G,  B/Y 
Golden 
rule, targets 
from multi-
annual plan, 
sometimes  more 
specific 
D/Y,  but not 
observed 
B/Y,  DIY 
B/Y,  DIY 
G/Y 
recently 0/Y, 
B/Y 
recently 
none 
G/Y,  D from 
multi-annual 
plan 
government 
guarantees 
included 
only borrowing of 
parastatal and 
government  funds 
no,  only survey of 
existing 
as total without 
specified limits 
guarantees to 
sectors outside 
general government 
not  included 
not all 
no 
yes,  as  estimated 
spending 
guarantees  to 
sectors outside 
general government 
not  included 
only  annual 
maximum 
no 
reserve 
funds 
included 
none 
none 
yes,  but 
very 
limited 
none 
yes,  at 
Finance 
Ministry 
no 
general and 
specific 
no' 
none 
several 
none 
yes 
special 
funds 
included 
since recently 
most  included 
most  included 
included 
no,  but some 
Sondervermogen 
annexed to 
budget 
annexed 
several 
at Interior 
and Defense 
Min. 
included 
most  included 
yes 
budget 
in one 
document 
recently 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no' 
no 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
no 
1  Public  invesUment budget  is prepared by the Minister of the Economy  alone,  Finance Minister has  no  say in 
it. 
2  Budget  law reflects current legislature and  cannot  introduce new  taxes nor  expenditure.  New  legislation 
affecting the budget is introduced in the Finance Bill. 
'  There  exists  a  rederve  fund,  which,  however,  is not available for  contingences.  The  reserve  fund  receives 
annual budget  surpluses  and  is used  to  finance  investment in the  following year. 
4  Special and  autonomous  funds  are  reported in the budget,  but not voted on by  Parliament. -64-
Table A4:  Transparency of the  Budget 
Country  Overall  E  E  R  N  c  L  A 
assessment  X  X  e  a  a  0  c 
p  p  v  t  p  a  c 
i  n  t 
F  A  s  A  t  s 
u  d  0  c  a  B 
n  m  u  c  1  a 
c  i  r  s 
t  n  c  e 
e 
Belgium  not always  y  y  y  nl  y  y  m 
transparent 
Denmark  incomplete,  but  y  y  y  p  y  y  t 
transparent 
France  transparent  y  y  y  0  y  t 
Germany  fully transparent  y  y  y  y  y  0 
Greece  transparent  y  y  y  g  y  0 
Ireland  incomplete,  not  n  y  y  n  y  0  c 
fully transparent 
Italy  hardly  n2  n3 
' 
y  n  y  y  m 
transparent 
Luxembg.  not fully  y  y  y  p 
transparent 
Nether- incomplete,  not  y  n  y  y  y  y  c 
lands  fully transparent 
Portugal  not fully  y  y  y  p  y  n4  c 
transparent 
Spain  partially  y  y  c 
transparent 
U.K.  transparent  y  y  y  y  y  y  c 
Notes:  Exp.  Funct.:  breakdown of expenditures by  functions;  Exp.  Admin.  :breakdown of expenditures by 
administrative responsibility;  Rev.  Source:  Breakdown of revenues by  source;  National Ace.:  link to 
national accounts  established;  Capital:  capital expenditures  identified;  Loans:  Loans  of government 
reported;  Acct.  Base:  Accounting base;  c:  cash basis;  g:  National account  codes  provided;  m:  mixed 
accounting base;  o:  provided separately p:  not provided,  but possible;  s:  t:  transactions basis 
1  National account classifications are published with one-year delay;  publication is planned to be 
suppressed. 
1  The  Appropriation Bill contains  a  breakdown  according to administrative  function,  however,  this 
classification often does  not  identify the department acually in charge. 
'A breakdown is provided  into  12  functions,  leaving,  however,  a  large amount  of unallocated  items. 
4  Some  information is provided. -65-
Table AS:  Treatment of Special  Funds 
Country  Procedures 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
\;ermany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembg. 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Por.tugal 
U.K. 
all but a  few  of approx.  100  special funds  are  now  in the budget.  Off-budget 
operations exist but are not published 
There  are  17  special funds  whose  assets are used  for  earmarked purposes.  Their 
expenditures  are  included under  the government spending limit. 
special funds  for  temporary operations are included in the budget. 
Sondervermogen des  Bundes  are included with their overall revenue or expenditure 
implications. 
Budgets of independent government bodies  are annexed to budget  and voted by 
Parliament.  They belong to specialzed development or research oriented bodies 
and services relieved from rigidities of Public Accounting  and  subject to 
special financial regulations.  If for  any reason administration of revenue or 
expenditure is impossible on the basis of the budget,  it can be made  on the 
basis of a  specific  law for  each time. 
Occasionally established funds  to enable State to administer monies  on behalf of 
private citizens or bodies  (for example,  if most  funds  come  from  sources other 
than general fund).  plus:  Social Insurance Fund,  Post Office Bank,  Sinking Fund 
and Lotterie Fund 
Special funds  exist for  pending legislation with global expenditure  estimates. 
Off-budget  funds  exist for certain ministries. 
n.a. 
Off-budget operations exist at 0.4%  of NNI.  They  are  included in deficit data. 
Other special funds  are  included in budget. 
.Numerous  off-:budget operations ··existed until l990·lltlct were- associ·ated with 
fiscal indiscipline.  There is a  large number  of autonomous  funds  and departments 
whose  budgets  are presented separately to Parliament,  or whose  budgets  are only 
subject to government  authorization. 
Little use of special funds,  no use of off-budget operations. -66-
Table A6:  Voting Procedures 
Country  Negotiations within  Parlia- Amendments  joint  global  time  prov. 
Government  ment  vote  vote  limit  if 
can  on  on  not 
all G  budget  met 
agenda  type  budget  p  a  are  are  can 
set by  negoti- r  m  ltd.  off- cause 
at  ions  0  e  setting  fall of 
p  n  govern-
d  ment 
Belgium  MB,HF  b  c  n  y  n  n  y  y  A  y  12s 
Denmark  c  s,G  bilat.  n  y  n  y  y  n  A  y  12s 
France  PM  b  bilat.  n  y  y  y  yl  nz  B  y  TE' 
Germany  HF  b  bilat.  y  y  n  n  y  n  A  y 
Greece  HF  G  c  n  y  n  n  n  y  A  y  0 
Ireland  c  D  c  n  y  yA  n  y  n  n  n  p 
Italy  HF  b,s  multi- n  y  y  n  n  n  As  y  max. 
lat.  4/12 
Luxembg.  y  y  Y'  n  y  A  y  12s 
Nether- c  b,s  bilat.  n  y  n  p  y  n7  B'  n  4/12 
lands 
Portugal  c  b,s  bilat.  n  y  n  n  n  A  y  0 
Spain  c  b  c  n  y  y  - y9  n  y  A  n  0 
U.K.  HFIO  b  bilat.  n  y  yll  n  y  n  BIZ  y  TE 
ote:  A:  at:ter general. debate;  b:  general. budget  gul.del.l.nes;  B:  before general. debate;  bl.l.at:  bl.l.ateral. 
negotiations between HF  and resort ministries;  C:  Cabinet;  0:  previous budget  continued;  PM:  Prime Minister; 
s:  specific budget targets  determined;  TE:  temporary budget  adopted. 
1  MPs  may  propose to reduce  a  receipt  accompanied with an  increase in another receipt,  but not an  increase in 
spending  accompanied with  a  decrease  in another  spending  item. 
2  Global vote on  existing entitlements,  vote  chapter by chapter on  new  authorizations. 
'  By  decree of government. 
4  Parliament can only  amend  tax provisions,  while  expenditure proposals  can only be  refused or  approved. 
s  Parliament first votes  on the Finance Bill which sets the overall ceiling for  government borrowing. 
However,  this ceiling being only in commitment  terms,  it is not  a  binding  constraint. 
6  Legally unrestricted,  but very limited in practice. 
7 Expenditures  are voted by  chapters,  revenues  separately. 
1  Before discussing the  individual chapters,  there is a  political discussion on  the global content of the 
budget. 
9 Unless  authorized otherwise by  government. 
10  MF  submits  proposal  to be voted by  C. 
11  Amendments  to the Finance Bill may  normally only reduce,  but not increase taxes.  See  also  fn.  11. 
12  ~e  House  of Commons  first votes  on  the Budget resolutions which  cannot be  amended.  The  resolutions 
determine what  goes  into the Finance Bill and how  that Bill might be  amended.  The  result is that Government 
cannot be  confronted with  a  budget  completely different from its proposal  and,  provided it has  a  majority in 
the Commons,  it can limit Parliament's  amendments  to what it deems  acceptable. -67-
Table A7:  Budget Monitoring Rules 
Country  Expenditure  Finance  Role of Parliament  Final 
Control by  Mi~istry  Report 
records  Due  After 
spending 
Belgium  HF  monthly  informed Oct.,  March  of  up to 
t+l  five 
years 
Denmark  Ministries  yes  informed  12 months 
quarterly 
France  HF  monthly  informed monthly,  debate  March  t+l 
in December 
Germany  Ministries  monthly  no role',  informed  4  months 
and HF  quarterly 
Greece  HF  monthly  informed in November  or at  3  months 
request 
Ireland  HF  monthly  informed quarterly  12 months 
Italy  M of Budget,  monthly  informed quarterly about D  6  months 
HF 
Luxembg.  M of Budget  quar- no  role 
terly 
Nether- HF  monthly  informed quarterly  9  months 
lands 
Portugal  Auditors only  monthly  no  role,  regularly  9  months 
for State  with  informed  -. 
sector  delay 
Spain  HF  and M of  monthly  quarterly 
Economy 
U.K.  HF  monthly  no  role,  bi-annually  3  months 
informed 
1  Parliamentary Committee  (Haushaltsausschuss)  monitores  execution. -68-
Table AS:  Budget Flexibility 
Country  MFcan  Cash Limits  Disbur- Transfers between  Budget  changes  Carry-over 
block  on  sement  Chapters  authorized by  to next year 
expenditure  Departments  approval~ 
Belgium  yes  within Depts2  new  law  yes' 
(March) 
Denmark  yes  yes4  new  law  yes1 
France  G'  yes  yes  lim,  by  decree  new  law
7  limited 
Germany  yes  yes  yes  within Depts.•  MF'  possible
10 
Greece  yes  yes  approved by MF  MF"  no 
Ireland  within  'Votes'  new  law  no 
approved by  MF 
Italy  yes  new  law12  yes 
Luxembg.  yes  possible 
Nether- rarely  yesu  Govt.
14  limited 
lands 
Portugal  yes  often  within Depts.  new  law  limited15 
approv.  by Parl. 
Spain  limited  new  law  limited 
U.K.  yes  approved by  MFI6  new  law  limited17 
1  By  authority other than executive of ressort ministries,  e.g.  MF  or financial controller. 
2  Transfers between Departments  require rare political consensus. 
'  Undifferentiated appropriations carried over by Royal Decree only;  differentiated appropriations carried 
over automatically. 
4  Only with approval by Finance Committee of Parliament. 
5  But of little relevance in practice. 
6 Government  can block  expenditure by decree. 
7  In special cases,  additional expenditure can be  authorized by government decree which must be endorsed in 
the next budget  law. 
'  Between departments,  consent of MF  is required. 
'  Upon  initiative from  government parties. 
10  Requires  consent of Parliament. 
11  MF  can seek budget  amendment  during  the discussion of the  law  closing the  account or authorize spending 
over ceiling. 
12  To  be submitted on  June  30  or before October 31. 
u  Cannot be  used to finance new  expenditure. 
14  Additional spending must be  compensated within the  same  chapter,  save  fore  exceptions with approval by 
Cabinet.  In such cases,  general compensation is sought or  emergency  spending  authorized. 
15M~y be authorized for  investment plans  and  autonomous  or social security funds  by the Budget Law. 
M  With  approval by Parliament only for transfers between  'votes'. 
17  Five percent of capital expenditures  and  defense  expenditures. -69-
Index Construction for  the  Empirical Analysis 
Item 1.  Structure of negotiations within government 
a)  general constraint: 
none  (0),  BfY  (1),  B/Y  and  DfY  (2),  GfY  or Golden Rule  (3),  GjY,  DfY 
(4). 
b)  agenda setting for budget negotiations: 
MF  or cabinet collects bids  from  spending ministers  (0);  MF  or cabinet 
collects bids subject to preagreed guidelines  (1),  cabinet decides  on 
budget norms  first  (2),  MF  proposes budget norms  to be voted on by 
cabinet  (3),  MF  or MP  determines budget parameters  to be  observed by 
spending ministers  (4). 
c)  scope of budget norms  in the setting of agenda: 
expenditure or deficit  (0),  'specific'  (1.33),  'broad'  and  'specific' 
(2. 66),  'broad'  (4). 
d)  structure of negotiations: 
all cabinet members  involved together  (0),  multilateral  (2),  bilateral 
between spending ministers  and MF  (4). 
General  agenda setting  scope of  -structure of 
constraint  -budget  norms  negotiations 
Belgium  0  1  1.33  0 
Denmark  4  3  1.33  4 
France  4  4  4  4 
Germany  3  1  4  4 
Greece  0  1  0  0 
Ireland  2  1  0  0 
Italy  2  1  2.66  2 
Luxembourg  3  - - -
Netherlands  1  3  2.66  4 
Portugal  1  2  2.66  4 
Spain  0  2  4  0 
U.K.  4  3  4  4 -70-
Item 2.  Structure of parliamentary process 
a)  amendments:  unlimited  (0),  limited  (4) 
b)  required to be  offsetting:  no  (0),  yes  (4) 
c)  can cause fall of government:  no  (0),  yes  (4) 
d)  all expenditures passed in one vote: 
yes  (0),  mixed  (2),  votes are chapter by chapter  (4) 
e)  global vote  on total budget size:  final  only  (0),  initial  (4) 
amendments  amendments  amendments  one vote  on  global 
limited  offsetting  cause fall  expenditure  vote 
Belgium  0  0  4  0  0 
Denmark  0  4  4  4  0 
France  4  4  4  2  4 
Germany  0  0  4  0  0 
Greece  0  0  0  0  0  _-.... 
·-
"Irel.and  4  0  4  0  0 
Italy  -4  0  0  2  0 
Luxembourg  4  0  - 0  0 
Netherlands  4  0  4  4  4 
Portugal  0  0  - 0  1 
Spain  4  0  0  0  0 
U.K.  4  0  4  4  4 -71-
Item  3.  Informativeness  of the budget draft 
a)  special  funds  included: 
no  (0),  some  (1),  most  (2),  yes,  but annexed  to budget draft  (3),  yes 
(4). 
b)  budget submitted in one  document:  no  (0),  recently yes  (2),  yes  (4). 
c)  assessment of budget  transparency by respondents: 
hardly transparent  (0),  not fully transparent  (2),  fully  tra~sparent (4) 
d)  link to national accounts: 
not provided  (0),  possible  (1.33),  provided in separate  documents 
(2.66),  direct link provided  (4) 
e)  government  loans  to non-government entities included in budget draft: 
no  (0),  reported in separate document  (2),  yes  (4) 
special  one  transparency  national  government 
funds  document  accounts  loans 
Belgium  2  2  2  0  4 
Denmark  2  4  2  1.33  4 
France  4  4  4  2.66  -
~ 
Germany  3  4  4  4  2 
Greece  3  0  4  1.33  2 
Ireland  1  0  2  0  2 
Italy  1  0  0  0  4 
Luxembourg  - 4  2  1.33  -
Netherlands  4  4  2  4  4 
Portugal  0  4  2  1.33  0 
Spain  3  4  2  - -
U.K.  4  0  4  4  4 -72-
Item 4.  Flexibility of Budget  Execution 
a)  MF  can block expenditures:  no  (0),  yes  (4) 
b)  spending ministries subject to  cash limits:  no  (0),  yes  (4) 
c)  disbursement approval  required from  MF  or controller:  no  (0),  yes  (4) 
d)  transfers of expenditures between chapters: 
unrestricted (0),  limited (0.8),  require consent of MF  (1.6),  require 
consent of parliament  (2.4),  only within departments possible  (4),  only 
within departments  and with consent of MF  (5). 
e)  changes  in budget  law during execution: 
at discretion of government  (0),  by new  law which  is regularly submitted 
during fiscal year  (1),  at discretion of MF  (2),  require consent of MF 
and parliament  (3),  only by new  budgetary law to be passed under  the 
same  regulations  as  the ordinary budget  (4). 
f)  carry-over of unused  funds  to next year: 
unrestricted  (0),  limited (1.33),  limited and requires authorization by 
MF  or parliament  (2.66),  not possible  (4) 
MF  can  cash  disburse- transfers  budget  carry-
block  limits  ment  changes  over 
approval  --
Belgium  0  0  4  3.2  4  0 
Denmark  0  4  0  2.4  4  0 
France  4  4  4  3.2  4  1 
Germany  4  4  4  1.6  3  2 
Greece  4  4  0  1.6  2  3 
Ireland  0  0  0  4  4  3 
Italy  0  0  0  0  1  0 
Luxembourg  4  0  0  0  - -
Netherlands  0  0  4  0  0  1 
Portugal  0  4  4  0  4  2 
Spain  0  0  0  0.8  4  1 
U.K.  0  4  0  2.4  4  1 -73-
Item 5.  Longterm Planning Constraint 
a)  multiannual target:  none  (0),  G or T  (2),  total budget size  (4) 
b)  planning horizon  (years):  two  (1)  three· (2),  four  (3),  five  (4) 
c)  nature: 
ad hoc  forecast  (1),  fixed forecast  (2),  updated forecast,  but not based 
on consistent macromodel  (3),  updated on basis of consistent macromodel 
(4) 
d)  degree of commitment: 
internal orientation (1),  indicative  (2),  weak political  (3),  strong 
political  (4) 
target  horizon  nature  commitment 
Belgium  0  0  0  0 
Denmark  2  2  2  2 
France  0  1  1  1 
Germany  4  3  4  3 
Greece  0  2  1  2 
Ireland  4  4  1  3 
Italy  4  3  1  3 
Luxembourg  0  0  0  0 
Netherlands  4  4  2  4 
Portugal  0  3  1  2 
Spain  0  4  1  1 
U.K.  2  4  4  3 -74-
Definition of Indices: 
1.  Structural index: 
Sil  sum  of row  entries of itens 1.  - 4. 
SI2  sum  of row  entries of items 1.'  2.  and 4. 
SI3  sum  of row  entries of items  1.  and 2. 
2.  Index of longterm planning constraint: 
CONl  sum  of row entries of items 5.,  3.,  plus  ammendment  index plus  flex 
CON2  sum  of row  entries of item 5.  plus  ammendment  index plus  flex 
CON3  sum  of row entries of item 5  plus flex 
where:  amendment  index is the  sum  of the first three  row  entries of item 2. 
and flex is the  sum  of the first,  second,  fourth  and last rows  of item 4. -75-
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